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3Chapter One  
 
Introduction 
 
4In the age of globalization, the puzzle of economic development has become more 
complicated.  Conventional paths to economic growth have become even riskier.  In the 
last 25 years, technological advancement and the liberalization of international trade 
policy seem to have compressed both space and time.  In this smaller and faster world, 
instability spreads more easily.  As transnational capital has become increasingly mobile 
and powerful, policy makers traditionally responsible for maintaining financial and 
political stability are finding themselves less and less in control of the rapidly changing 
world system.1 Recent changes to the political economic system have forced academics 
and policymakers to think about old problems in new ways. 
 Many theorists have postulated that Neoliberal reforms are a prerequisite for long-
term, stable growth.  Countries of the less-developed world are said to require Neoliberal 
economic policies in order to curb inflation and to make up for deficiencies in domestic 
savings by attracting foreign capital.  Given the average domestic savings rates 
throughout much of the developing world, it would be hard to argue that foreign 
investment is unnecessary.  Yet at the same time, Neoliberal reforms have brought 
tremendous social and economic costs, especially to those in the middle and lower 
classes.  Critics argue that Neoliberalism diminishes national policy autonomy and is too 
costly for those members of society who are least capable of bearing the burden.  
Nevertheless, in the last quarter century, the ultimate vision of Western-style 
individualism seems to have taken hold, as democracies and liberal economies are 
propagated all over the world.   
 
1 William I. Robinson, Transnational Conflicts: Central America, Social Change, and Globalization (New 
York: Verso, 2003), 11. 
5In this context of globalization and liberalization, many Latin American nations 
made the conversion from authoritarian governments to democratic ones during the 
1980s and 1990s.  Yet the stability of these governments was shaken in the mid 1990s, as 
international financial crises spread to Latin America, and elected governments were 
toppled by popular dissent.  While these democratic regimes were not replaced by 
dictatorship as they had been 25 years earlier, the failure of elected leaders to survive 
their terms was the result of their inability to manage instability in the new world system.  
Not all of these democratic governments were destabilized by crisis.  Why were some 
governments unable to outlast financial crisis while others emerged unscathed?  Why did 
potentially destabilizing economic or political conditions create financial instability in 
some countries and not in others?  These are the principal questions that this work will 
attempt to answer.  In order to do so, it is first necessary to describe the complex 
relationship between political and economic instability. 
 Simply put, governments and markets form the link between political and 
economic instability.  Instability that results from changes in economic or political 
conditions can therefore spread back and forth between the economy and the political 
system.  Instability in the economy can spread to the political situation via the 
weaknesses of government, and that political instability can further impact economic 
conditions through markets.  The result is a circular pattern of increasing instability with 
four prominent phases.  Despite the given numbering scheme, this pattern is circular and 
need not begin or end with any particular phase.  In the first phase, economic instability 
becomes an issue when economic expectations are not met, and therefore a negative 
discrepancy occurs between what citizens feel entitled to and what they actually receive.  
6This “relative deprivation,”2 creates tensions among the populace which may or may not 
generate national instability.  If the feeling of relative deprivation occurs among a group 
of elites, then the political ramifications can be dire.  In the second phase, the reigning 
regime has the opportunity to address the unmet expectations of its citizens.  If the 
government is unable to successfully address a relative deprivation through institutional 
support or coercive control, then political instability or violence is likely to occur.  In the 
third phase, the outcome of political instability is determined in a contest between elites 
loyal to the reigning regime versus elites supportive of dissident movements.  In an 
effectively functioning democratic system, this contest can occur through a 
constitutionally sanctioned process, whereas disillusioned citizens of ineffective or 
exclusive governments may resort to political violence.  In the fourth phase, the 
international financial community reacts to the political situation through the valuation of 
monetary instruments in capital markets.  A negative perception of investment 
opportunities will adversely affect the financial resources of the country undergoing 
instability, thereby compounding the crisis.  In any of the four identified phases, it is 
possible for a country to end the debilitating cycle of instability.  However, when 
governments are incapable of effectively addressing instability, and when the 
international financial community negatively perceives a countries financial profile, a 
downward spiral of simultaneous political and economic instability can ensue. 
 In order to further explore the relationship between economic and political 
instability, a comparative case framework will be established.  The series of financial and 
economic crises that swept through the developing world in the 1990s will facilitate a 
comparison of states and markets during crisis periods.  Case studies will be developed 
 
2 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 15. 
7for Argentina and Chile, and a comparative analysis will be done between Latin America 
and East Asia.  Whereas similar political and economic conditions were experienced 
among Latin American states during the 1990’s, the long-run outcomes varied.  In East 
Asia, liberalizing reforms were conducted differently, and under very different social and 
political conditions.  In many cases, these reforms were much more successful in East 
Asia than in Latin America.  By comparing international examples of success and failure, 
it is the purpose of this study to identify sets of conditions and policy reforms that would 
enable developing countries to enjoy the benefits of globalization.  Whereas 
Neoliberalism has become the hegemonic ideology of adjustment to the global economy, 
the efficacy of Neoliberal reforms will be the focus of this study.  An analysis of these 
cases may provide unique insight into the relationship between economic and political 
instability, and may provide an answer to the main question of this study: How can 
Neoliberal reforms be modified to have more positive outcomes in the developing world? 
 This study eventually seeks to address the recent political backlash against 
globalization and to discuss the efficacy of Neoliberalism.  It will ultimately be shown 
that Neoliberalism and globalization are beneficial to developing countries in the long-
run, so long as they are carried out in accordance with a careful consideration of the 
political, economic, and social reality of the reforming country.  Globalization can have a 
positive effect on the developing world if liberalizing reforms are adapted to work in 
specific political and economic contexts.   
 It is important to note that for the purposes of this work, a positive outcome of 
reform is defined as an improvement in the economic wellbeing of the citizens of a 
nation, measured primarily in terms of GDP per capita, the percentage of citizens living 
8in poverty, and some measure of the distribution of wealth.  Neoliberal reforms 
necessarily entail short-run costs, and can potentially bring long-run costs that outweigh 
the benefits of reform if the process is not carried out effectively.  The two most 
important determinants of the long-run outcome of the liberalization process are the 
degree to which the economy is controlled by the state prior to the implementation of 
reforms and the openness of the political system.  More market dependency on the state 
implies a more costly transition to open markets.  An open political system is most 
vulnerable to political instability that results from the short-run costs that occurs during 
the reform process.  Conversely, a closed political system may only institute reforms 
biased in favor of the interests of the ruling elite.  The ensuing political instability can 
bring further economic costs that create a disastrous cycle of crisis, a cycle represented 
by the causal model of this study.   
 Long-term destabilization, stagnation, and the ensuing anti-globalization 
movement, are indicative of a two-part failure of the key actors in the reform process.  
Both international financial institutions and national governments have failed to address 
the importance of the political, economic, and social conditions of reforming countries.  
Potential weaknesses in the markets and governments of reforming countries must be 
addressed by a reform package in order to ensure the long-run net-benefit of the plan.  In 
light of complicating conditions, careful reform planning is necessary to make the reform 
process worth the cost.  There are ways in which Neoliberal reform can be instituted, 
while minimizing the social costs and the resulting political backlash.  However, in the 
current world order, a so called ‘Washington Consensus’ of seemingly standardized 
macroeconomic policy reforms are prescribed by powerful international financial 
9institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury Department.  These 
policy reforms include: the privatization and deregulation of state owned enterprises, 
financial market and trade liberalization, and the general minimization of the role of the 
state in the economy.  This study seeks to identify practical policy modifications that 
should be made to the Washington Consensus so that globalization will lead to more 
positive outcomes in the developing world.  The developing world needs more 
globalization, but reforms must be adapted to the political and economic context of each 
country in order to minimize the costs and to eliminate the roots of the political backlash 
that currently stalls the process.    
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Chapter Two 
 
Review of the Literature 
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Introduction  
 
The following literature review attempts to provide an understanding of the 
competing arguments on the key topics that this work addresses.  These are contentious 
issues that have sparked controversies within their respective fields.  The purpose of this 
literature review is to provide a clear theoretical framework for the principal arguments 
of this work.  Furthermore, this review will summarize the divergent opinions of various 
authors on the theoretical underpinnings of the main argument of this work: that 
globalization can have a positive effect on the developing world if liberalizing reforms 
are adapted to work in specific political and economic contexts.  While many have 
written about the causes and effects of economic and political instability, these theories 
will be reassessed within the context of globalization.  The following questions provide 
the structure of the literature review.  How has the context of globalization and 
Neoliberalism impacted global stability in the last twenty-five years?  Why do men rebel?  
What determines whether a regime will survive or collapse once political dissidence has 
formed?  Finally, how does political instability impact the economy of the host nation? 
 
The Context: Globalization and Neoliberalism  
 
The cases of instability that form the basis of this study have occurred in the 
context of globalization.  In his book, Transnational Conflict, William Robinson develops 
a useful vocabulary for describing the fundamental aspects of globalization.  Robinson 
writes that in the last twenty-five years, a fundamental shift has occurred in which the old 
12
world economy has disappeared and a new global economic system has emerged.  The 
world economic system of past epochs was one in which each country developed its own 
circuits of accumulation and production that were ultimately connected via international 
commodity and capital markets.  In the economy of today, the production process itself 
has been globalized.  Transnational capital now commands the production process 
without regard for national political boundaries.3 Globalization is therefore a process of 
integration, wherein all the economies of the world are unified to form a single mode of 
production.  Increases in trade and financial flows have occurred in the past, a process 
Robinson terms internationalization. However, what differentiates the recent 
phenomenon is the globalization of the production process, which Robinson terms 
transnationalization.4 In this new epoch, transnational capital has gained a new-found 
dominance in its relation with labor.  Robinson argues that globalization has integrated 
national social classes into one international class system in which the dominance of 
elites is solidified by their connection to transnational capital.  The nation-state has begun 
to break down as the central locus of class and group relations.5
Robinson asserts that the nation-state has further lost its importance in regulating 
capital, and transnational institutions are rising to fill the void.  International institutions 
are created collectively by various nation-states in order to address cross-border issues.  
Many international institutions currently present distinct gradations of “state-ness,” but 
they are beginning to shed their connection to the nation-state apparatus to varying 
degrees.  Supranational economic and political institutions, which Robinson refers to as 
transnational states, have risen to advance the emergent hegemony of the transnational 
 
3 (Robinson 2003, 13) 
4 (Robinson 2003, 13-14) 
5 (Robinson 2003, 31) 
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capitalist class.6 This process is taking place in international forums, economic and 
political.  These forums include the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, the various 
political groupings of wealthy nations such as the G8 and G22, and the old formal 
political forums such as the UN and the EU.7 In the context of the growing importance of 
evolving transnational organizations, Robinson writes, “the function of the nation-state is 
shifting from the formulation of national policies to the administration of policies 
formulated by a transnational elite operating through supranational institutions.”8 The 
growing power of transnational capital and supranational institutions in markets and 
governments has altered the relationship between economic and political instability.  The 
consequences of this process of globalization are central to this study. 
 In addition to globalization, the ideological rise of Neoliberalism in the last 
twenty-five years has played a key role in shaping the relationship between economic and 
political instability.  In his book, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance, Eric 
Helleiner describes the rise of Neoliberalism as a dominant economic ideology.  
Beginning in the 1970’s, an ideological shift took place in which the popularity of 
Keynesian embedded liberalism lost popularity and the Neoliberal ideas of Milton 
Friedman and Friedrich Hayek were increasingly promoted by intellectual networks.  
Keynesianism promoted international trade and “productive” capital flows while 
explicitly controlling short-term “unproductive” capital flows.  Keynesianism generally 
prescribes a greater degree of government intervention in markets than does 
Neoliberalism, which promotes the perfect mobility of capital.  By the end of the 1970’s 
it had become clear that Neoliberalism was gaining clout within academia and 
 
6 (Robinson 2003, 43) 
7 (Robinson 2003, 44) 
8 (Robinson 2003, 44) 
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international institutions.  Additionally, economic stagnation in the 1970s and 1980s 
created an intellectual climate conducive to alternative economic paradigms.9
Neoliberal policies are often collectively referred to as the ‘Washington 
Consensus’, signaling the importance of the U.S. Treasury Department in the promotion 
of Neoliberalism around the world.  Helleiner illustrates the consistency between 
Neoliberalism and US economic interests, which meant that changes in name at the US 
Treasury Department from the “nationalist Secretary John Connally to the “Neoliberal” 
Secretary George Shultz, led to no change in the administration’s position on capital 
movements.”10 Helleiner argues that liberal theory had gained prevalence starting as 
early as the 1960s, when the birth of the Euromarkets provided the means to circumvent 
the capital controls of Bretton Woods.  The clear turning point in the ideological shift 
came alongside clear examples of failure on behalf of embedded liberal policies, 
exemplified by the u-turn in French economic policy under the government of Francois 
Mitterrand in 1983.  The central purpose of Neoliberal reform is to slow inflation and to 
improve the financial position of the state.11 The Neoliberal model rests on the premise 
that investment is the most important stimulus for economic growth, and despite the 
name, it is more closely linked to Classical models than to the embedded liberalism of the 
Second World War era.12 By the 1980’s a precedent had been established connecting the 
failure to adopt Neoliberal reforms with potentially rapid and destructive financial 
destabilization.13 
9 Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance (Ithaca: The Cornell University Press, 
1994), 15-16. 
10 (Helleiner 1994, 119) 
11 (Helleiner 1994, 15) 
12 (Helleiner 1994, 15) 
13 (Helleiner 1994, 162) 
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Geoffrey Garret contests the popular view that the international financial 
community has come to play a dominant role in global politics in the new era of 
globalization and Neoliberalism.  In his chapter entitled, Global Markets and National 
Politics, Garret argues against the common belief that, “where states were once the 
masters of markets, now it is the markets which, on many crucial issues, are the masters 
over the governments of states.”14 Garret uses an empirical analysis of the OECD 
countries to challenge the claim that the multinationalization of the production process is 
the defining characteristic of globalization.  For Garret, the most politically significant 
aspect of globalization has been the integration of financial markets.  Garret further 
refutes the notion that the increasing power of financial markets has eroded national 
policy autonomy, arguing that governments have not been forced to engage in a “policy 
race to the Neoliberal bottom.”15 Garret hypothesizes that national governments will 
continue to play an important role in the economy by providing certain collective goods 
that even pro-market economists support.  Such collective goods range from the 
accumulation of human and physical capital and the maintenance of social stability in 
times of market uncertainty.  Furthermore, Garret postulates that governments can be 
powerful advocates for the Neoliberal policies that others argue limit government 
autonomy.16 “There is no evidence that the financial markets attach interest-rate 
premiums to the expansion of the public sector.”17 While Garret views the integration of 
financial markets as the most consequential aspect of globalization and Neoliberalism, he 
also sees financial markets as being fundamentally disinterested in the affairs of national 
 
14 Geoffrey Garret, “Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Cycle,” in  
Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), 147. 
15 (Garret 2000, 183) 
16 (Garret 2000, 183) 
17 (Garret 2000, 183) 
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governments, so long as they do not directly infringe upon returns to investment.  Garret 
paints a picture of the modern era of globalization as one wherein Neoliberalism achieves 
a sort of compromise with the embedded liberalism of old.18 
The purpose and effect of Neoliberal reform policies are illustrated in the piece, 
Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social-Democratic Approach, by Luiz Carlos 
Bresser Pereira, Jose Maria Maravall, and Adam Przeworski.  Whereas Garret draws his 
conclusions on the impact of Neoliberalism and globalization from a study of the OECD 
countries, Pereira, Maravall, and Przeworski highlight the effect of Neoliberal reforms on 
the developing world.  In times of crisis, Neoliberal reform is often seen as necessary in 
order to restore the purchasing power of wages in the context of hyper-inflation and to 
attract much-needed foreign capital.19 Financial crisis often serves as the impetus to 
economic reforms, yet in the short-run, reforms can deepen or even prolong the crisis.  
Furthermore, Neoliberal reforms have been seen to have severe short-run economic costs, 
costs felt especially by the lowest classes of society.20 Pereira, Maravall, and Przeworski 
argue that in order to be carried out effectively Neoliberal stabilization programs must 
involve a transitional reduction of demand, due to the combined effect of reduced public 
spending, increased taxation, and high interest rates.21 In addition, policy reforms such as 
tariff eradication, antimonopoly measures, and privatization can simultaneously increase 
unemployment and decrease the government revenue needed to provide social services.  
Such contractionary measures are collectively termed an “austerity package,” and can 
 
18 (Garret 2000, 184) 
19 Eduardo A. Gamarra, “Market Oriented Reforms and Democratization in Latin America: Challenges of 
the 1990s,” in Latin American Political Economy in the Age of Neoliberal Reform (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 1994), 9.  
20 Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira and Jose Maria Maravall and Adam Przeworski, “Economic Reforms in New 
Democracies: A Social-Democratic Approach,” in Democracy Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin 
America (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993) 183. 
21 (Pereira, Maravall, Przeworski 1993, 184) 
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bring severely negative economic conditions to a country already in crisis.  That 
Neoliberal policies often have a negative short-run impact on economic growth will not 
be new information for anyone with a background in economics.  Indeed, if 
unemployment does not drastically increase alongside Neoliberal reforms then this can be 
taken as a sign of the failure of their implementation.  As Pereira, Maravall, and 
Przeworski point out, “reform programs are, thus, caught between the faith of those who 
foresee their ultimate effects and the skepticism of those who experience only their 
immediate consequences.”22 The political and economic issues surrounding Neoliberal 
reform are key elements of the context within which the crises of this study occurred. 
 Of these competing arguments on the efficacy and nature of Neoliberalism, there 
are aspects of truth in all of them.  The work of Pereira, Maravall, and Przeworski more 
effectively address the political issues relevant to reform in the developing world, 
whereas Garret’s theories more accurately describe the effect of reforms in industrialized 
nations.  The argument of this work is partially based on the assertion of Pereira, 
Maravall, and Przeworski that liberalizing reforms usually have negative short run effects 
that can endanger the political support for reforms. 
 
The Impetus to Political Violence  
 
In order to understand the destabilizing potential that the reform process has for 
developing countries, it is necessary to identify the kinds of conditions that lead citizens 
to rebel against their government.  The cause of rebellion has long been a subject of study 
in political discourse.  In his book, Foreign Investment and Political Conflict in 
22 (Pereira, Maravall, Przeworski 1993, 184) 
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Developing Countries, John M. Rothgeb, Jr. compiles the history of deprivation-based 
theories that attempt to describe the root of rebellion.  The idea that human beings 
respond through dissident behavior to a perceived failure of the system to provide certain 
goods has been common to political theory since John Locke.  “When the people are 
made miserable, and find themselves exposed to the ill-usage of arbitrary power… it is 
not to be wondered that they should rouse themselves and endeavor to put the rule into 
such hands which may secure to them the ends for which government was at first 
erected.”23 Since Locke, most political theorists have furthered the notion that 
governments exist to provide certain basic “necessities” to citizens.  A failure to do so 
constitutes a “deprivation,” which justifies and inspires political change.   
 Rothgeb writes that deprivation-based theories are built on the notion that when 
economic, social, or political conditions become bad enough, it is natural to desire 
political change.24 Within this large group of deprivation-based theories, there are 
several specific types.  Absolute deprivation is a theory that sees political conflict as a 
result of extreme poverty and the stagnation of economic growth.  This theory suggests 
that there is a universal level of human tolerance for poor economic conditions, but when 
economic conditions become bad enough, dissident behavior becomes a natural response 
to a failure of the system.25 Political deprivation theory states that government repression 
creates rebellion by limiting the ability of citizens to voice grievances within the system.  
According to this theory, when politically active members of society perceive civil 
disobedience as being more efficacious than legal participation in achieving a desired 
 
23 John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government (Chicago: Henry Regency Co., 1955), 187-188. 
24 John M. Rothgeb, Jr. Foreign Investment and Political Conflict in Developing  Countries (Westport: 
Praeger Publishers, 1996), 19. 
25 (Rothgeb, Jr. 1996, 13) 
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outcome, than political violence will be the result.26 A third theory, labeled relative 
deprivation, states that inequality in the distribution of income is what leads to rebellion.  
This version of relative deprivation theory is a class-based analysis, implying that 
political violence is the result of inequalities that are perceived to be unjust or 
undeserved.27 
Ted Gurr uses the term “relative deprivation,” but with a distinct meaning from 
that of the old theories which bear its name.  In his seminal work, Why Men Rebel, Gurr 
argues that it is the failure of economic and social conditions to meet expectations that 
brings men to rebel.  For Gurr, a “relative deprivation” occurs when citizens do not 
perceive economic and social conditions to meet their expectations, and they are 
therefore denied of something for which they feel entitled.  Gurr describes relative 
deprivation as, “the term used to denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy 
between the “ought” and the “is” of collective value satisfaction.”28 Relative 
deprivations occur when societal conditions create a divergence between expectations 
and reality.  The result is discontent, anger, and frustration, which Gurr sees as an 
impulse to action.  This frustration will have political ramifications to the degree that 
citizens perceive violence against political actors as justified and potentially useful in 
improving their value positions.29 
Gurr argues that there is no particular threshold for poor economic conditions, 
below which rebellion is guaranteed.  Rather, this threshold can be seen as the constantly 
evolving expectations of the citizenry.  If people do not expect more than they have, no 
 
26 (Rothgeb, Jr. 1996, 19) 
27 (Rothgeb, Jr. 1996, 15) 
28 (Gurr 1970, 13) 
29 (Gurr 1970, 319)   
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matter how poorly they live, they will not rise up in rebellion.  This assertion is based on 
empirical evidence gathered through psychological testing.   Gurr asserts that relative 
deprivations are most likely to lead to organized political violence, and therefore likely to 
cause political change, when the deprivation occurs on the part of the economic or 
political elite.  Otherwise, frustrations caused by relative deprivations will merely result 
in political turmoil: “unorganized political violence with substantial popular support.”30 
In addition, when the wealthy, educated, and well-connected feel as though the system 
does not further their interests, they will be more inclined to try to bring about an extra-
systemic change.  Gurr goes on to assert that the potential for political violence is 
determined by the scope and intensity of the discontent which results from the 
deprivation.  The potential for political violence is further amplified to the extent to 
which errors are committed on the part of the government which result in even more 
depriving conditions.31 Therefore, Ted Gurr’s analysis highlights two key determinants 
of the magnitude of violent dissent: deprivations between expectation and reality in social 
and economic conditions, and the perceived ability of the government to alleviate these 
depriving conditions.   
 In his book, The Economics of Political Violence, Dipak K. Gupta incorporates 
the theory of relative deprivation postulated by Gurr into a broader theory of collective 
rebellious behavior.  Gupta reaffirms Gurr’s principal thesis that participation in dissident 
political movements is determined by “personal frustration caused by an individual’s 
inability to attain something he feels is rightfully his.”32 Yet, Gupta takes the theory a 
 
30 (Gurr 1970, 11) 
31 (Gurr 1970, 319) 
32 Dipak K. Gupta. The Economics of Political Violence: The Effect of Political  Instability on Economic 
Growth  (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 251. 
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step further by arguing that there are two main categories of frustration: individual and 
group.  While individual frustration may lead men to take rebellious action against the 
state, frustration associated with membership in a particular group is what motivates men 
to participate in collective rebellion.  Gupta argues that the degree to which popular and 
organized political violence occurs is determined by the “pursuit of group utility.”33 
The passion with which an individual will pursue his or her group utility is a 
product of two key factors: the closeness of the association with the group, and the 
intensity of the frustration.  Gupta labels the former as ideology and the latter as a 
product of economic and social conditions, although the two are typically linked.  When 
these two elements of group utility are linked, such as when unemployment is perceived 
to be a product of membership in a particular group, then the passion of group utility can 
be intense.  Gupta identifies two kinds of group identities: ascriptive and adoptive.  
Membership to an ascriptive group is involuntary and includes such categories as race, 
language, and religion.  Adoptive group membership is voluntary and includes interest 
groups, clubs, and social groups of similar preferences.  Frustration will be more intense 
when it is linked to an ascriptive membership as it is not a product of choice and it is 
generally not reversible.34 Discrimination based on race or economic class will therefore 
lead to a group unity that lends itself to popular and organized participation in collective 
rebellion.  This sense of group unity can be filtered and molded by the opposition group 
into an ideology.  Gupta writes that the meshing of preferences between that of the 
individual and of an ideologically oriented group, especially within the elite, will result in 
widespread political violence.  Gupta agrees with Gurr that a universal threshold of 
 
33 (Gupta 1990, 251) 
34 (Gupta 1990, 252) 
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tolerance for poor economic conditions does not exist.  However, Gupta points out that 
poor economic conditions will have the effect of lowering the opportunity cost of 
participation in rebellious movements.  For example, unemployed workers are much 
more likely to spend a day conspiring and protesting than are employed workers.  In 
order to participate, it is necessary for the individual to forego a short-run gain for the 
sake of the larger entity, group, or nation.  This is more likely to occur as that foregone 
short-run gain decreases.35 Both Gurr and Gupta assert that participation in rebellious 
behavior is generally rational, based on an individual cost-benefit analysis.  Gurr and 
Gupta agree that participation in dissident movements is determined by frustrations that 
are a product of relative deprivation.  However, Gupta goes a step further in detailing 
how the kind of aggressive behavior that an individual is likely to engage in will depend 
on the degree to which the frustration is perceived as resulting from individual or group 
conditions.  Gupta writes that unemployment and poverty do not cause political turmoil 
without the presence of a group identity.  Group identity can be shaped by elites of the 
opposition in order to promote participation in violent political dissidence.  If frustration 
is linked to a collective ideology, then it has the potential to significantly undermine 
political stability.36 Gupta and Gurr provide a framework for understanding the causes of 
rebellious behavior and the determinants of the form this rebellion will take. 
 
35 (Gupta 1990, 255) 
36 (Gupta 1990, 256) 
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Political Conflict: Authority vs. Opposition 
 
The ability of governments to contain political conflict within institutionally 
justified or legal frameworks is central to this study.  The first step that a government can 
take to minimize the destabilizing effect of economic crisis is to allow political 
challengers within to address their concerns within constitutional frameworks.  Bruce 
Bueno De Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and William C. Smith 
describe the political mechanisms that minimize instability before it becomes violent.  In 
their chapter entitled, Political Institutions, Political Survival, and Policy Success, De 
Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith deny that the ability of a leader to repress 
dissidence is the ultimate cause of stability.  These authors attempt to explain how 
seemingly small policy failures can result in the collapse of a ruling regime, whereas in 
other examples, seemingly endless blunders have little or no effect on the ability of a 
regime to remain in office.  De Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith highlight two 
deep-seated political institutions that determine political stability: the size of the 
selectorate and the size of the winning coalition.37 By the selectorate, they mean those 
people with the institutionally guaranteed right to take part in the selection of leaders.  By 
the winning coalition, they mean the portion of the selectorate whose support is vital for 
the incumbent government to remain in office.38 Politicians attract and maintain a 
winning coalition by distributing things of value, public and private.  Private goods 
include special privileges, employment in government jobs, access to graft and bribes, 
 
37 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James D. Morrow and Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith, 
“Political Institutions, Political Survival, and Policy Success,” in Governing for Prosperity (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2000), 60. 
38 (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 2000, 60) 
24
favorable tax or contractual terms, and judicial and other forms of favoritism.  In the 
developing world, the distribution of private goods may be less regulated, and may 
therefore play a larger role in the decision making process of the selectorate.39 Public 
goods affect the welfare of everyone in the state and can include the provision of national 
security, general economic growth, and the amount of generally distributed state 
resources.40 De Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith argue that political legitimacy is 
undermined when the incumbent fails to divide the benefit from government revenue and 
public policy in order to reward the winning coalition, and when credibility problems 
arise surrounding the future distribution of goods.41 Without providing the necessary 
quantity of goods, political leaders may lose cohesion within the winning coalition, and a 
struggle between the winning coalition and the opposition may spill over into 
unsanctioned, violent political conflict. 
Once political conflict has exacerbated legal frameworks, political violence 
occurs between the government and the dissident movement. In another section of his 
work, Why Men Rebel, Ted Gurr establishes that when political violence occurs, the 
ability of the government to minimize participation in extra-systemic dissidence will 
determine the result of the political conflict.  Gurr highlights two basic elements that 
determine the ability of the government to remain in power.  The actualization of 
discontent in the form of political violence is modified by the institutional support and 
coercive control of the ruling regime.42 The magnitude of political violence is minimized 
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to the degree to which the government is capable of providing institutional support for, or 
coercively controlling its citizens.  Conversely, the ability of dissidents to achieve 
organizational support and coercive control will also determine their ability to change the 
political system.  Therefore, if dissidents have widespread social support and a high 
degree of coercive capacity compared with the regime, then they may be capable of 
displacing the ruling authority.  Coups typically occur and political concessions are most 
readily granted by elites when the balance of social control and support favors the 
opposition.  If the balance of power between the authority and the opposition is relatively 
equal, then political violence is likely to be protracted and intense.43 
In his work, The Economics of Political Violence, Dipak K. Gupta expands upon 
Gurr’s support and control framework for understanding violent political conflict.  Gupta 
writes that the authority can maintain stability by modifying or even harnessing the 
feelings of collective frustration by maintaining legitimacy.  For Gupta, legitimacy is 
maintained in three ways.  Legitimacy can be maintained in times of conflict by 
providing economic and political opportunities, and by lowering the cost of involuntary 
group membership.  The third way in which legitimacy can be achieved is by raising the 
cost of dissident political activities by enforcing coercive measures.44 These three 
mechanisms fit neatly within Gurr’s description of institutional support and coercive 
control.  Gurr and Gupta both view political conflict as a “carrot and stick combat” 
between the authority and the opposition over the political participation of key members 
of society.  However, Gupta also underscores the importance the ability of the regime to 
adjust to address the problem by displacing the political blame for the deprivation, or by 
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rebalancing value expectations with value capabilities.  Authoritarian regimes, for 
example, have less structural conduciveness to political change and therefore will suffer 
less frequent but more violent political conflicts.45 Gupta argues further that regimes that 
lack structural conduciveness to change may enhance feelings of group schism within 
society by making group divisions more pronounced or by establishing a zero-sum game 
mentality between groups.46 
The theories of Gurr and Gupta suggest that during periods of economic 
deprivation, the survivability of the government is determined by the ability of the 
government to address and eliminate the initial deprivation.  So long as the net-benefit of 
living under the current regime is perceived by members of the society to be greater than 
any viable alternative, the current regime remains in power.  This style of analysis 
emphasizes the importance of economic over political conditions.  However, Minxin Pei 
and Ariel David Adesnik refute this emphasis in their article entitled, “Why Recessions 
Don’t Start Revolutions.” Pei and Adesnik propose that crisis-ridden regimes collapse 
mainly because of internal political stresses.47 Pei and Adesnik base these claims on an 
empirical study of severe economic crises in Asia and Latin America since the Second 
World War.  Of 93 economic crises analyzed, those that resulted in direct regime collapse 
were rare.  Pei and Adesnik argue that in these rare cases of immediate regime collapse, 
the ultimate determinant of whether a regime survived or collapsed was the degree of 
internal cohesion among the ruling elite prior to the crisis.48 “When economic difficulties 
widen rifts within a country’s leadership and undermine the authority of government, the 
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survival of the regime is unlikely.”49 Therefore, the most important determinant of the 
political response to economic crisis is not the size and scope of the frustration that 
results from the crisis, but the ability of the ruling elite to remain unified.  Furthermore, 
the most important economic aspect of the crisis is the way in which it affects the well-
being of members of the elite.  A mild recession, when combined with strife among the 
ruling elite, can bring about rapid and violent regime change.  In contrast to deprivation 
theorists such as Gurr and Gupta, Pei and Adesnik write that, “political institutions 
determine regime survival.”50 
The potential policy ramifications of political change are outlined in Jonathan 
Hartlyn and Samuel A. Morley’s piece, entitled Political Regimes and Economic 
Performance in Latin America. Regime change need not lead to any substantive policy 
change as it can merely be a transfer of power from one group of elites to another with 
similar preferences.  Hartlyn and Morley argue that when regime change does bring about 
significant modifications of policy, the consequences may be most immediately visible in 
terms of political liberties and respect for human rights.51 Regime changes may also lead 
to changes in the way policies are determined, which may or may not in turn lead to 
changes in the substance of the policies themselves. Finally, regime changes can bring 
about significant economic and social policy modifications that have important 
distributional consequences.  In the developing world especially, regime changes “have 
often been associated with abrupt, pendular shifts in economic policies.”52 
49 (Pei and Adesnik 2000, 141) 
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The Economic Impact of Political Instability and Change 
 
There has been a great deal of research devoted to the study of the economic 
impact of political change.  Economic ramifications of political change are seen on 
domestic and foreign markets.  In another chapter of his work, The Economics of 
Political Violence, Dipak K. Gupta describes the economic impact of political instability 
on domestic markets, which he sees as several fold.  Most fundamentally, all transactions 
imply a contract between two entities, and all contracts require trust.  The lack of 
continuity of legal frameworks protecting such transactions undermines this trust.  
Conflict between groups in society further diminishes interpersonal trust.  Inconsistent 
economic policies, as a result of constant or violent political changes, can further 
undermine confidence in markets.  Additional uncertainty about the future undermines 
consumer and investor confidence in markets clamoring for predictability of the future. 53 
The lack of confidence in future economic conditions results in decreased rates of 
consumption and investment as citizens resort to “hoarding.”  Hoarding involves hiding 
money under the proverbial mattress or sending money to safe havens in foreign financial 
markets.  The hoarding of money that would have been used for consumption decreases 
aggregate demand.  Hoarding has the effect of constricting the money supply, creating a 
downward multiplier that forces the economy to settle for a lower level of income and 
employment.54 The resulting constricted money supply will lead to increased interest 
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rates, which may not have the impact of stimulating investment, as economic institutions 
often fail to function normally in times of political crisis.  Furthermore, this politically-
motivated reduction in the money supply will render government monetary policy largely 
ineffective.55 Aggregate supply may also be negatively affected via labor and capital 
markets.  In times of political violence, the production process may be interfered with 
physically and directly.  Politically motivated strikes may cripple the economy.  
Frightened workers may fail to show up for work.  A large segment of the labor force 
may leave work to fight, and possibly to be killed.  Troop movement can disrupt 
agricultural production.  Fighting between groups or acts of sabotage can destroy capital 
goods, such as factories, railways, and networks of electricity and water.  The effect of all 
of these potential outcomes of political instability is to decrease aggregate supply and 
aggregate demand, decreasing output, employment, and incomes and potentially 
increasing prices. 
 Gupta writes that the decrease in economic growth shown to occur in times of 
political instability is likely to decrease government revenue generated from taxes.  
Taxable incomes will decrease and the ability of government officials to collect taxes 
may diminish as well.  However, in spite of this dwindling tax revenue, authorities may 
be compelled to spend more on the military and other pacification programs.56 
Coinciding increases in spending and decreases in revenue will increase the government 
deficit, and may lead to spiraling debt to be felt by future generations long after the 
political situation has calmed.  In sum, an economy torn by violent political conflict will 
be characterized by low incomes, high unemployment, inflation and debt.  “However, the 
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extent to which this extremely gloomy prognosis will materialize will depend on the 
magnitude of external assistance, especially by a superpower, or the nation’s capacity to 
finance its debts through the sale of its natural resources…”57 Injections of foreign 
currency can cushion the shock, but the political and economic circumstances required 
for such an injection are generally the exception rather than the rule.   
 In his book, The Political Economy of Emerging Markets, Javier Santiso 
describes the probable market reaction to political instability from the point of view of 
the banking community.  Given the importance of international investors and 
international financial institutions, this perspective is useful to understand how the 
perceptions of the financial community are likely to impact economic conditions of the 
country in crisis.  Santiso highlights the importance of maintaining investor confidence in 
order to preserve stability.  Confidence is necessary in order to uphold investors’ loyalty, 
to minimize the influence of their voice, and at all costs, to avoid their exit.  Exit on 
behalf of foreign investors involves the devaluation of assets and illiquidity, whereas the 
voice of foreign investors implies the loss of policy autonomy.  The rules established by 
the international financial community for developing world governments are conventions 
that change according to the macroeconomic, social and political perceptions of emerging 
market analysts.58 Noncompliance brings capital flight, illiquidity, and spiraling debt.  
As currency speculators have become increasingly capable of moving money around the 
globe more or less instantaneously, the potential for massive capital flight acts as the 
ultimate discipline on governments.  Political “irresponsibility,” a term used to describe 
governments closing markets to foreigners or exercising deficit spending, creates a lack 
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of confidence on the part of the international financial community that will bring further 
illiquidity, restricting investment and economic growth.59 The key players in the game of 
confidence include rating agencies, government officials, international organizations, and 
media corporations.  Fund managers emphasize the importance of investor relations and 
the timely release of financial and economic data.  Periods of political turnover are 
associated with a significant increase in the spread on emerging market debt securities 
over the US Treasuries Bills, signaling investors’ fears that political instability will 
negatively impact rates of return.60 In addition to political instability, the lack of 
transparency can make financial instability even more pronounced, and in times of crisis, 
international contagion can spread based on a lack of confidence in emerging market 
economies in general.  Whereas a lack of transparency and political stability will 
necessarily impede returns to investment, it is natural that foreign investors enforce these 
ideals through the threat of their voice and their exit.  Santiso writes that transparency of 
information and the stability of governments is thereby reinforced in the long-run by the 
rent maximizing behaviors of world financiers.61 
In her chapter entitled Emerging Market Makers: The Power of Institutional 
Investors, Mary Ann Haley provides a counterpoint to Santiso’s perspective.   Haley 
illustrates inefficiencies that arise as the international financial community becomes more 
and more powerful in emerging market economies.  She argues that the ability of 
international investors and financial institutions to impact a country economically is 
dependent on the degree to which the economy has opened up to flows of foreign capital. 
The purpose of opening one’s financial markets is to attract foreign investment and to 
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retain the approval of international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the 
IMF.  Haley writes, “The most effective means of attracting capital into developing 
countries has shifted rapidly from pledging allegiance to one of the cold war rivals to 
marketing the nation-state to the world’s financiers.”62 Developing nations market 
themselves to foreign capital by establishing “pro-market,” Neoliberal policies.  Once 
Neoliberal reforms have been instituted, foreign investors enter the market, and by the 
strength of their position in relatively small, emerging markets, they gain incredible 
power in determining the valuation of assets.  Haley argues that the prices of monetary 
assets on emerging market are no longer determined by the movements of the invisible 
hand, but by the visible hands of foreign investors.63 Haley agrees with Santiso that the 
preferences of these foreign institutional investors thus become a guide for countries in 
need of capital.  However, unlike Santiso, Haley argues that these preferences are not 
necessarily beneficial to a country in political transition.  In the developing world, 
inefficient financial markets empower money managers who value stability and growth 
over political democratization.64 The ramifications of the market response to political 
instability in the developing world are incredibly important to this study. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Theory & Methodology 
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Introduction to the Model 
 
The following model of political and economic instability will be used to structure 
the analysis of the Argentine and Chilean crises of the late 1990’s.  It will be shown how 
instability or underperformance in the economy may result in political instability, and 
vice versa.  This model is designed to reflect the context of globalization and Neoliberal 
economic policies which have fundamentally altered the relationship between political 
and economic stability.     
 Instability is communicable between the economy and the political system on two 
levels.  At the individual level, instability can spread between politics and economics via 
the participation of citizens in political violence.  The amount of civilian participation in 
political violence is determined by individual frustration that is the result of economic 
conditions.  In turn, this political violence affects economic conditions.  At the 
institutional level, instability can spread via states and markets.  Shifts in the political 
power of the state impact the distribution and quantity of economic values distributed in 
the market.  These economic values in turn shape the distribution of political power.  
Therefore, instability that results from economic or political change can spread back and 
forth between the economy and the political system.  Instability in the economy can 
spread to the political system via the weakness of government relative to dissident 
movements.  Political instability impacts economic conditions by influencing the 
confidence of market actors.   
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Individuals
Institutions
By compiling these two bilateral cause and effect relationships, it is shown that 
instability can spread between the economy and the political system through a four stage 
process.  This process may begin with any of the four stages, yet in the context of 
globalization and Neoliberal reform, instability often appears to begin within economic 
conditions.  The model functions as follows: if the value of private and public goods 
obtained by citizens is less than the expected value, then the resulting civil frustration 
affects the hegemony of the state.  If the ability of the state to remedy this frustration is 
less than the relative deprivation felt by citizens, then a change will occur in political 
conditions.  If the political conditions are perceived by investors and consumers to impact 
their financial position, then the value of goods, services, and financial instruments will be 
affected on markets.  If a change in market values occurs, then shifts in factor inputs will 
affect economic conditions.  Through these cause and effect relationships, a political or 
economic change can impact the entire system.   
Economic Frustration Political Violence
The State Markets 
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Economic and Political Instability 
 
VC < VE      SA < PV 
 
Q’ < Q*      I < R 
 
Economic Conditions = The conditions affecting the generation and distribution of wealth as they are perceived  
 by individual citizens. 
VE = The expectations of citizens as to their capacity to obtain things of value. 
VC = The actual capacity of citizens to obtain things of value. 
 
The State = The governing regime and the formal institutions that establish the rules of the political system. 
SA = The ability of the state to remedy or to control the expression of frustration in the form of political violence. 
PV = The strength of dissident movements that engage in collective acts of political violence against the state. 
 
Political Conditions = The conditions affecting the distribution of political power as they are perceived by                 
 individual citizens. 
I = The perception of market actors as to the future rate of return on investments within the host country. 
R = The perception of market actors as to the amount of risk associated with investments in the host country. 
 
Markets = Forums in which economic and financial actors establish the price of things of value. 
Q’ = The output, income, employment, and relative value of the currency of the host country. 
Q* = The theoretical, potential value of these economic and financial variables within the host country. 
Markets 
Political Conditions Economic Conditions 
The State 
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Elaboration on the Model 
 
Although instability often appears to begin with economic conditions, this model 
is circular and need not begin or end with any particular phase.  In the first phase, 
economic instability becomes an issue when economic expectations are not met, and 
therefore a negative discrepancy occurs between what citizens felt entitled to and what 
they actually received.  This “relative deprivation,”65 creates tension among the populace 
which may lend itself to participation in collective acts of political violence.  If this 
feeling of relative deprivation occurs among a group of elites, then the political 
ramifications can be dire.  In this phase, the political culture of the country experiencing 
instability is especially important.  In certain countries, extremely harsh economic 
conditions may not drive citizens to express frustrations in the form of collective acts 
taken against the government or the regime.  The attitude towards revolt, or the 
willingness of citizens to challenge the institutional structure, plays a vital role in 
determining the level of individual participation in collective acts of dissidence.  To the 
degree to which the government has established legitimacy and enjoys the trust of the 
people, dissidence can be undercut before it becomes a serious threat to stability.  This 
first phase of the model draws upon the “relative deprivation” theory postulated by Ted 
Gurr and further developed by Dipak Gupta in order to identify the kinds of economic 
conditions that bring citizens to rebel.66 
In the second phase, the reigning regime has the opportunity to address the unmet 
expectations of its citizens.  The ability of the state to remedy the frustrations of citizens 
 
65 (Gurr 1970, 15) 
66 (Gurr 1970) and (Gupta 1990). 
38
is determined by the degree to which an institutional structure has been put in place that 
is capable of responding effectively to the potential crisis.  Formal institutions of 
government must respond, either by distributing public goods to redress material needs or 
by controlling the actions of potential dissidents.  The flexibility of governing institutions 
is also an important element.  Constitutional structures that allow for the replacement of a 
government without the destruction of the regime are better equipped to survive periods 
of instability.  If the government is unable to successfully address a relative deprivation 
through institutional support, coercive control, or fluid adjustment, then widespread 
political violence may occur.  The theories of Bueno De Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, 
and Smith were especially useful in this phase for describing the determinants of the 
capacity of the state to respond to frustration.67 
In the third phase, the outcome of political instability is determined in a contest 
between those loyal to the reigning regime versus those supportive of dissident 
movements.  In an effectively functioning democratic system, this contest may occur 
through a constitutionally sanctioned process, whereas disillusioned citizens of 
ineffective or exclusive governments may resort to political violence.  As political 
violence intensifies, a critical tipping point occurs when a change of government or the 
destruction of the regime become viable options in the minds of key political actors.  
Mounting political violence in the street may be the most visible element of instability, 
but behind closed doors, politicians pressure key leaders to either fix the problem or step 
down, depending on their interests.  The government is toppled when the support of 
enough business and political leaders is lost.  When the loss of support of key actors 
renders the president incapable of governing, then the president will either resign or face 
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more coercive pressure from the military.  In this phase, the theories of Jonathan Hartlyn 
and Samuel A. Morley were especially useful to describe the potential policy 
ramifications of political instability and change.68 
In the fourth phase, economic actors react to changes in the political situation via 
their participation in markets.  Political conditions may affect domestic markets by 
influencing the supply or demand for goods and services, but in the context of 
globalization and the liberalization of financial markets, the participation of the 
international financial community has become increasingly important in determining the 
market reaction to political change.  The international financial community reacts to the 
political situation through the valuation of monetary instruments in markets.  A negative 
perception of investment opportunities will adversely affect the financial resources of the 
country undergoing instability, thereby compounding the crisis.  A devaluation of the 
goods, services, and the currency of the host country will impact economic conditions, 
thereby completing the circular orientation of the model.  In any of the four identified 
phases, it is possible for a country to end the debilitating cycle of instability.  However, 
when governments are incapable of effectively addressing instability, and when the 
international financial community negatively perceives a countries financial profile, a 
downward spiral of simultaneous political and economic instability can ensue.  In this 
fourth phase the writings of Dipak Gupta were especially useful for describing the impact 
of political change on the domestic economy whereas Javier Santiso and Mary Ann 
Haley were utilized to describe the impact via international financial markets.69 
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According to this model, the degree to which economic instability will spread to 
the political system is determined by the ability of formal and informal institutions within 
society to facilitate the maintenance of social order when a collective frustration occurs 
among the populace.  In concordance with the empirircal findings of Pei and Adesnick, 
this model is largely based on the notion that political stability will remain so long as the 
state is capable of maintaining order through the use of one or more of several possible 
mechanisms.  As the principle formal institution, the state can attempt to maintain order 
in one or more of three ways: by providing institutional support to the effected populace, 
coercively controlling discontents, or fluidly adjusting to the problem.70 Governments 
with the ability to employ any or all of these mechanisms effectively will be more 
effective at managing economic crisis and may avoid the political ramifications of 
economic instability.  Authoritarian governments may be able to ensure stability through 
economic crisis by coercively controlling dissident movements.  More democratic 
governments may remain stable by providing institutional support, minimizing the impact 
of the crisis on the lives of its citizens, or by fluidly adjusting to shift the political blame 
of the crisis or to correct underlying policy failures.  Conversely, there are examples of 
both forms of government which have failed to employ these mechanisms effectively, 
and were subsequently toppled.  Negative economic conditions begin to threaten the state 
when they directly impact the capacity of the state to maintain order. 
 Informal institutions also play a role in transmitting the impact of economic 
conditions to the political environment.  Social norms and conventions, such as the 
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propensity to save money or consume goods, can have a tremendous impact on the 
breadth and severity of instability.71 The degree to which political change will impact the 
economy is further determined by the efficacy of economic policies instituted by the 
newly appointed political actors, the ability of international financial institutions to 
address market instability, and the international banking community’s perception of the 
political situation.72 Economies in which there are policies viewed by the international 
community as financially irresponsible may be especially vulnerable during times of 
instability.  Economies in which Neoliberal reforms have been successfully instituted in 
the past may not be pressured by IFI’s to introduce austerity measures and may maintain 
the confidence of international investors throughout crisis.  The consequences of a failure 
to maintain the confidence of international markets in periods of political instability can 
be devastating.  Capital flight, currency collapse, and spiraling debt can have long-lasting 
effects on a countries economic conditions.  In turn, these deteriorating economic 
conditions further augment the frustrations of the people.  Therefore, a circular 
relationship is established in which instability can be self-perpetuating as it spreads back 
and forth between the state and financial markets. 
 
Methodology 
 
It is important to note that for the purposes of this work, a positive outcome of 
reform is defined as an improvement in the economic wellbeing of the citizens of the 
nation, measured primarily in terms of GDP per capita, the percentage of citizens living 
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in poverty, and some measure of wealth distribution.  This definition of success is derived 
from the fact that stable, long-run economic growth can be the most effective means of 
eradicating poverty.  Elevated, sustained economic growth rates are a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for the improvement of standards of living in the developing world.  
While economic growth is not the entire solution, it is a very important part.  Studies of 
the economic experience of Latin America in the 20th century suggest that, “…without 
economic growth, it is virtually impossible to make lasting improvements in the welfare 
of the poorest sectors.”73 The achievement of sustained, equitable economic growth will 
serve as the definition of success throughout the remainder of this study. 
 In order to assess the determinants of success or failure within Latin America, I 
will develop case studies for Argentina and Chile.  Whereas similar exogenous shocks 
were experienced in these states during the 1990’s, the long-term political and economic 
outcomes varied.  In the case of Argentina in 1999, the devaluation of Brazil’s Real, 
combined with plummeting global commodity prices, brought on an economic crisis that 
led to tremendous political instability, concluding only upon a change of government.74 
In Chile during the same period, the near financial standstill in Asia and the ensuing drop 
in copper prices did not have an equally tumultuous impact on the economy or the 
political environment.75 Apparent similarities of institutions and political economic 
conditions between Argentina and Chile bring more credence to the claim that the 
discrepancy of outcomes can be explained by identifiable policy differences.  These two 
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case studies may provide unique insights into the relationship between economic and 
political instability and an answer to the main question of this study: How can Neoliberal 
reforms be modified to have more positive outcomes in the developing world? 
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Chapter Four 
 
International Financial Crises 
 
45
Introduction 
 
Following the deregulation and liberalization of capital markets over the last 
twenty years, currency crises struck Mexico, East Asia, Russia, and Brazil between 1994 
and 1999.  These international currency crises established a context of defensive 
economic policy amidst widespread fears of contagion in Latin America and other 
emerging markets.  These international financial crises had several consequences relevant 
to the Argentinean, Chilean, and East Asian case studies.  First, the negative effects of 
open capital flows shaped the perception of citizens towards market liberalization, and 
therefore influenced the political environment within which Neoliberal reforms were 
attempted.  Second, the crises forced policymakers to reevaluate their regulation of 
capital flows and currency fluctuations.  Third, and perhaps most importantly, this first 
round of crises noticeably influenced the behaviors and attitudes of the international 
money centers towards emerging markets.  I will address the specific ways in which these 
crises affected the individual cases of Argentina and Chile in their respective chapters.  
 
The Mexican Peso Crisis 
 
The Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994 had immediate ramifications in other emerging 
markets, most notably in Argentina.  The crisis began in the last quarter of 1994 as a 
result of mostly endogenous factors.  The Zapatista peasant rebellion in southern Mexico 
negatively affected the confidence of domestic and foreign investors.  Yet more 
importantly, increased domestic credit from official development banks drove down the 
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relative value of the Peso.  Furthermore, as capital flowed excessively from the state into 
the private sector, the Central Bank lost the currency reserves that guaranteed the stability 
of the Peso.76 Domestic imbalances were augmented by the herding instincts of large 
institutional investors, urged by analysts who viewed the Peso as being overvalued by as 
much as 20%.  Foreign investors fled en mass in late 1994, and the Peso collapsed against 
the dollar, devaluing by more than 300% over the span of the next year and a half.  The 
currency crisis was only ended when a bail out loan was organized by President Bill 
Clinton to the tune of $50 billion.77 
Mexican Peso Crisis
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The aftershocks of the crisis were felt throughout Latin America in 1995.  Despite 
the bail out organized by the NAFTA-bound U.S., many other emerging market 
 
76 Valeriano F. Garcia, Black December: Banking Instability, The Mexican Crisis and its   
Effects on Argentina (Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
1997), 24. 
77 (Garcia 1997, 25)   
47
economies suffered reduced rates of capital inflows, higher interest rates, and reduced 
growth rates as a result of the crisis.  The “Tequila Effect,” as it was known in the 
southern Cone, hurt Argentina especially due to the perception of the international 
financial community that Argentina’s currency managing regimes suffered similar 
problems.78 Despite the perception, Argentina’s currency regime was distinct, being 
managed by a currency board using an automatic adjustment rule.  This rule generally 
exposed the Argentine Peso to more volatility but provided the opportunity to let of some 
steam in times of serious confidence crisis.  Although Argentina did not suffer from over 
expansionary monetary policy, current fiscal expenditures had increased substantially in 
the final quarters of 1994, seriously deteriorating the state’s fiscal accounts. Furthermore, 
there was a fear on the part of international investors leading up to the crisis that the 
Argentine government would repeat the 1991 forced swap of sovereign bonds for longer-
term time deposits.79 
The immediate impact of the resulting loss of investor confidence was two fold: a 
domestic run on banks in favor of cash, and an international run on the Peso in favor of 
the US dollar and other strong currencies.  An increased cash to deposit ratio and capital 
flight each have the effect of significantly constricting the money supply.  In the case of 
Argentina, the decrease in the demand for money was the initial cause of the devaluation 
rather than the increase in the supply of money as was the case in the Mexican crisis.  In 
both cases, the lack of an official lender of last resort to anchor confidence in the 
currency board was a primary factor in the devaluation.  Argentina lacked the 
intervention of the US, and consequently suffered more debilitating long-run economic 
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costs.  Following a crisis, currency regimes have two main options: to deflate the money 
supply or to devalue the currency.  In countries where wages and prices are relatively 
sticky, the result of a deflation of the money supply is long-run unemployment.  In the 
1995 crisis, Argentina chose to deflate the money supply rather than to devalue the Peso, 
and resulting rates of unemployment surged as high as 18% at the turn of the 
millennium.80 
The East Asian Crisis 
 
The East Asian Crisis of 1997-1998 had a tremendously destabilizing impact on 
the region and long-term economic consequences that were felt far beyond.  Prior to the 
crisis, the East Asian economies had benefited from growth in the private sector led by 
deregulation and high rates of investment, largely domestic, coinciding with relatively 
low rates of inflation.  The Asian Tigers of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and 
Taiwan had become the often cited examples of the benefits of opening up to foreign 
capital inflows.  The deregulation of the East Asian financial markets occurred in the 
environment of pressure from the Wall Street-US Treasury-IMF complex, with little 
regard given to the need for the sequencing of reforms or for regulations designed to 
minimize the negative impact of speculative movements.  In East Asia, as in Mexico 
before it, the mobility of capital was given “priority over all other considerations” by 
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foreign and national financial policy makers.81 The crisis began in Thailand in the 
summer of 1997 and quickly spread to Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea.   
The countries affected had robust fundamentals leading up to the crisis, including 
strong GDP growth, low unemployment, low inflation and budgets balanced with the 
help of relatively large domestic savings rates.  However, the countries hardest hit by the 
crisis were institutionally unprepared for the potentially destabilizing short-term capital 
flows entering and exiting their emerging economies.  All of the countries in question 
suffered from poorly regulated private banks and the widespread perception in the 
business community of minimal risk.82 Coming off of decades of impressive economic 
growth, businesses became overzealous in their pursuit of growth.  Financial institutions 
of the private sector, and increasingly foreign capital inflows from the major money 
centers, were all too willing to lend.  These factors led to the overexposure of the East 
Asian economies to short-term foreign investment.  The countries least exposed to such 
capital flows suffered the least.  China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore all 
minimized their exposure, yet for different reasons.  China maintained strict capital 
account controls and regulations of international trade.  Hong Kong had a history of 
disciplined openness, with a currency tied to the dollar through a currency board 
arrangement.  Taiwan benefited from consistent economic growth fueled by exceptional 
rates of domestic savings which minimized the importance of short-run foreign 
investment in the economy.  Singapore also benefited from consistent growth with 
minimal inflation and large rates of domestic savings.   
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These crisis-immune economies also benefited from large foreign exchange 
reserves unaffected by short-term inflows.  China maintained large enough reserves to 
pay for 6 months of imports, and in Singapore short-term debt as a percentage of foreign 
exchange reserves made up a miniscule 2%.83 Most important for those economies that 
emerged unscathed from the crisis was the degree to which their foreign debt was held in 
long-term vs. short term notes.  Singapore’s foreign debt as a percentage of GDP prior to 
the crisis was a stable 10%, with only 17% of this debt being held in short-term notes.  
On the other hand, Thailand’s debt to GDP ratio was 50%, and 57% of this debt was 
short-term.  Similar degrees of foreign indebtedness were experienced in the other crisis-
prone countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea.84 In these countries, the 
foreign debt played a critical role in the economy, as it facilitated increases in private 
sector lending and the money supply.  In 1996, foreign debt amounted to as much as 25% 
of bank loans to the private sector.  In the case of Singapore, only 2% of bank loans were 
provided by short-term foreign capital.  Even a relatively mild slow-down of foreign 
capital inflows would have significantly undermined the ability of the crisis-prone 
economies to remain afloat.   
The crisis was set in motion in Thailand and the other crisis-prone economies as 
highly leveraged local banks borrowed short-term from abroad and lent long-term to 
questionable ventures in real estate and emerging businesses.  These potentially 
destabilizing underpinnings were brought to fruition by the mass exodus of foreign 
capital from the international money centers of New York, London, and Tokyo.85 Both 
South Korean and Thai companies missed payments on foreign debt as early as January 
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of ’97, prompting fears of further corporate failures to service massive foreign debt.  In 
January, the South Korean chaebol, Hanbo, declared bankruptcy under the weight of $6 
billion in debt.  Local policy makers issued directives to contain the damage.  The central 
banks of Thailand and Malaysia established limits on real estate credits and capped the 
fraction of loans that could be secured by stocks and bonds, but these measures were too 
little too late.  In May of 1997, the Baht was hit by a massive speculative attack, forcing 
the Bank of Thailand to spend nearly $10 billion in defense of the currency, nearly 
wasting all of its foreign currency reserves.  The Thai central bank insisted on the 
sustainability of the currency peg right up until the July 2nd, 1997 decision to float the 
Baht, which tumbled by 18% overnight.86 By October of 1997, all of the crisis-prone 
countries had been hit, and the Malaysian and Thai currencies had depreciated against the 
dollar by more than 50%.  Negative outcomes were not isolated to financial markets, as  
GDP for most East Asian nations plummeted in 1998.  
GDP During the East Asian Crisis
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
M
a r
- 9
6
J u
l - 9
6
N o
v - 9
6
M
a r
- 9
7
J u
l - 9
7
N o
v - 9
7
M
ar
-9
8
Ju
l-9
8
No
v-9
8
M
ar
-9
9
Ju
l-9
9
No
v-9
9
M
ar
-0
0
Ju
l-0
0
No
v-0
0
M
ar
-0
1
Date
A
nn
ua
lG
D
P
G
ro
w
th
Japan South Korea Russia Thailand
Source: “Global Macroeconomic Figures.” Bloomberg 2005. 
 
86 (Desai 2003, 120)   
52
Tremors were felt around the world.  The confidence of Wall Street and the other 
money centers in emerging markets had been shattered.  Although stock prices fell 
especially in East Asian and Latin American exchanges, the American markets were no 
exception.  The Dow Jones fell 554.26 points, one of the largest intra-day point losses in 
history.87 Over-indebtedness was a major concern for much of Asia and Latin America, 
one that came to the forefront of investors minds in the wake of the Asian crisis.  As 
international investors began to worry about the risks of investing in heavily indebted 
entities, foreign portfolio investment became more squeamish and speculative currency 
attacks intensified around the world. 
 
The Ruple and Real Crises 
 
The liberal market transition of the Russian economy following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union succeeded in liberalizing trade and rationalizing financial markets.  Liberal 
reforms were implemented despite the fractured political climate and institutional 
vacuum left by the Communist dictatorship.  Although successful in decreasing the rate 
of inflation to single digit levels, the reforms prolonged a transitional recession with steep 
economic and human costs.  The shock therapy instituted by the technocratic reform 
team, led by the IMF, was increasingly met with opposition by left-leaning Russian 
lawmakers.  Amidst the ongoing confrontation, which threatened to freeze the process 
entirely by 1998, Boris Yeltsin attempted to maintain the financial health of the federal 
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government, which was still a key employer in the Russian economy.88 Unable to raise 
adequate tax revenue, and prohibited by the IMF from borrowing from the Russian 
Central Bank, Yeltsin turned to foreign capital markets, which were unwilling to loan in 
the long-term given the emerging market scares of the time.  Short-term foreign debt 
soon exceeded the foreign exchange resources available to finance a sudden withdrawal.  
Russian private banks also borrowed heavily from foreign markets, unrestricted by 
government regulation, and by 1997 foreign liabilities as a percentage of their assets had 
increased to 17%.89 
Within this context of endogenous fiscal weakness, the Russian economy was 
subjected to two major exogenous shocks.  The first shock was the East Asian Financial 
Crisis which severely limited the supply of credit, dramatically increasing the interest rate 
for loans available to emerging market countries.  The second shock came with the 
dramatic decrease in oil and nonferrous metal commodity prices on international markets, 
two of Russia’s primary sources of foreign exchange earnings.  The price of oil declined 
from $23 dollars a barrel in mid-1997 to $11 a barrel a year later.90 A souring trade 
balance combined with soaring interest costs on Russia’s sovereign debt, pulling the 
current account into the red by $5 billion by mid-1998.  Fearing an impending 
devaluation of the Ruple, non-resident lenders of short-term capital pulled out of Russia 
despite the hike of the central bank interest rate to an incredible 150%.  As Russian 
households began to by foreign currencies, capital flight became unrestrainable, and 
nearly $5 billion dollars of an IMF bail-out loan used to defend the currency disappeared 
in two weeks.  The ensuing default of the Russian sovereign debt worsened the situation 
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as Russian commercial banks were faced with rising interest rates on their foreign 
liabilities and disappearing domestic assets.  Under pressure from the US Treasury, the 
IMF pushed the Russian federal government to provide 20% cash payments to all 
investors, forcing Russia to generate the cash via inflationary domestic economic 
policies.91 
Financial crisis spread to Latin America as investors reacted to the East Asian 
crisis by pulling out of the Brazilian Real in 1997.  Brazilian president, Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso responded with a Neoliberal stabilization plan designed to stave 
downward pressure on the Real.  Under his guise, the Central Bank’s overnight lending 
rate was increased to 43.5%, and government expenditures were at once cut by 2.5%.  
These drastic and immediate reforms had partial success until the following year, when 
contagion from the Russian Ruple crisis further undermined investor confidence in 
emerging markets outside of Asia.  Further fiscal tightening and increased interest rates 
failed to curb capital flight out of Brazil of $1 billion per day.92 The Brazilian 
government spent in excess of $40 billion of their foreign exchange reserves in a 
desperate attempt to defend the currency.  As capital continued to exit the economy, 
Brazil turned to the IMF in 1998 in hopes of ending the balance of payments crisis.  
Despite the support of the IMF, Brazil’s managed devaluation or “Real Plan” of 1994 
was hastened when the Real was allowed to float freely on January 18th, 1999, and 
subsequently fell from 1.32 to the dollar to 2.14 to the dollar in less than two weeks.   
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Brazil's Real Crisis
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The IMF responded by imposing even stricter fiscal targets in the midst of the 
economic decline.93 Weakness in the current account became an even greater problem 
dragging down the Real as central bank lacked effective control over other elements of 
the public sector.  As had been a major problem in Russia, the non-financial public sector 
in Brazil maintained a lax policy on balancing their budgets, refusing to accept the 
necessary spending cuts.94 
The crisis of the Brazilian Real was similar to the East Asian and Russian crises 
except that Brazil faced a relatively positive economic outlook prior to the crisis, as 
inflation had declined since the adoption of the “Real Plan” in 1994 and real GDP had 
increased to a relatively stable 3.2% by 1997.  Although Brazil was also severely 
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dependent on short-term foreign loans, the crisis was not as lengthy or as damaging 
because it occurred in a time of long-run economic growth.  The prices of Brazilian 
exports on world markets, although held flat by shrinking global demand, were not 
diminished to the degree that oil and metals had for Russia.  Furthermore, Brazil’s 
exports became more competitive versus Argentinean and other producers.  The amount 
of Brazil’s foreign debt and the extent of the speculative attacks were more of an issue 
than were the unavailability of foreign exchange earnings that had plagued East Asia and 
Russia.  GDP growth rebounded into the black by 1999, and by 2000 it had once again 
surpassed 4%, while inflation remained relatively low at 7%.95 
The most painful element of the crisis was a result of the IMF-designed austerity 
measures designed to facilitate repayment of debt, and unemployment shot up to 7.1% in 
1999 amid steep reductions in government social spending.  The devaluation of the Real 
further undermined Brazil’s current account, and Brazil’s debt as a percentage of GDP 
increased from 25% in 1997 to 47% in 2001.96 The Real devalued an additional 30% in 
2001 as concerns about Argentine default spread to Brazil, requiring five consecutive 
interest rate increases of 375 basis points by the central bank.  Brazilian devaluation 
hampered the Argentine export sector as Brazil’s similar products became relatively 
cheaper overnight.  The loss of demand for Argentine exports crippled the ability of the 
Argentine government to acquire foreign exchange.  The lack of foreign exchange 
reserves would become the ultimate factor threatening the Argentine currency peg up 
until the collapse of 2001.97 
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Conclusions 
 
An analysis of these cases of international financial crisis yields practical policy 
recommendations to Neoliberal reform.  The following conclusions will be presented in 
more detail in the “Comparative Analysis” chapter.  First, the social disposition towards 
high rates of domestic savings provides stability during reform periods as local capital is 
less likely to rapidly exit the domestic market.  Second, the liberalization of capital 
markets should be done slowly so as to allow the markets to develop and to minimize 
potentially painful valuation corrections.  Successful reforms in Taiwan and Singapore 
were pursued gradually over the course of many years of economic growth.  Third, there 
are a series of financial techniques that reforming governments can employ in order to 
prepare for Neoliberal reform.  These defenses against potential crisis include the 
accumulation of large amounts of foreign currency reserves, and the minimization of 
foreign debt, especially that held in short-term notes.  Finally, the efficiency of the formal 
institutions of the reforming state must be taken into account when assessing the relative 
risk of reform.  
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Chapter Five 
 
The Argentine Case 
 
59
Introduction 
 
The Argentine Crisis of the 1990’s is an important case of political and economic 
instability for this study.  Financial and economic instability resulted in the collapse of 
the Fernando de la Rua government in 2001.  In order to discuss the crisis in depth, a 
brief history of Argentina’s political economy will be given.  Two important variables 
will be highlighted in the period leading up to the crisis: the degree to which the economy 
had undergone market liberating reforms prior to the crisis, and the degree to which the 
political decision making process was inclusive.  The ultimate goal of this section will be 
to use the Argentina case in order to discuss the efficacy of the stabilization policies 
implemented by the government and international financial institutions.   
 
History 
 
Export-led growth, driven by inflows of foreign capital and substantial natural 
resource wealth, led to long-run economic expansion in the decades leading up to the end 
of the 19th century.  Yet the overwhelming dependency of the Argentine economy on 
primary commodity exports left the nation vulnerable to the massive shock of 
plummeting foreign demand during the Great Depression and the First and Second World 
Wars.  In 1930, the armed forces intervened, overthrowing the liberal Radical Party 
government, ushering in over a decade of conservative rule.98 Throughout the 1930s, the 
Argentine state practiced regular intervention in the economy in order to transfer capital 
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from agriculture into the emerging industrial sector.  The state practiced New Deal-style 
regulation of the economy, including the implementation of an income tax and foreign 
exchange controls, and the Argentine Central Bank was established in 1935.   During this 
period, the conflict between elites whose livelihoods were based on the production of 
agricultural commodities such as beef and wheat clashed with the emerging urban 
bourgeoisie of the industrializing cities.  Pampean conservatives, tied to the successful 
beef and grain industries, came into conflict with the liberals of the industrial economy.  
During the interwar period, the urban working class doubled in size to one million.99 The 
rapidly changing class structure disrupted the balance of power in the Argentine political 
economy.  The frequency of strikes and other demonstrations symbolized the rising 
power of organized labor.  When it became apparent that conservative elites planned to 
rig the upcoming presidential election, the armed forces carried out a coup on June 4th, of
1943.   
 A young Colonel, Juan Domingo Peron rose in the ranks of the military 
government as a charismatic leader, helped by the mass mobilization of organized labor.  
Peron successfully welded the interests of the rising working class and the industrial 
entrepreneurs, creating a populist political movement to support his 1946 election to the 
presidency.100 Coherence between these two, often conflicted, groups was facilitated by 
the Fordist notion popular among industrial entrepreneurs of the time that the interests of 
business were inextricably bound to those of the workers.  Peron instituted economic 
policies based on import substitution industrialization through which growth in the 
industrial sector was fed by domestic demand and subsidized credit and protected from 
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foreign competition.  By redistributing incomes and widening internal markets, Peron’s 
strategies had achieved 25-29% GDP growth from 1946-1948, but by the late 1940’s, 
stagnant rural output and costly imports began to pull down the economy.  Although the 
Peron government realized significant benefits to wages and working conditions, by the 
early 1950’s the Argentine economy had reached the limit of Peron’s inward-looking 
growth model.  As a result, inflation began to creep above 30% by the early 1950’s, and 
many segments of the urban elite that stood to benefit from growth in exports began to 
demand a return to participation in world markets, dividing Peron’s political coalition.  
Following the removal of Juan Peron from office by the military in 1955, Argentina was 
plunged into a prolonged epoch of political and economic instability.  Although 
Peronismo officially fell in 1955, it would remain the strongest political force in 
Argentina, as the memory of the charismatic populist lived on in the memory of the 
working class.101 
The 1950’s saw a return to the global market, as Argentina opened to foreign 
investment and multinational corporations in the hope of stimulating growth in the 
historically profitable sectors of the economy.  For the 1950s and ‘60s, the result would 
be violent stop and go cycles of growth and high inflation on which the fate of the two 
main parties, the Peronistas and the Radicals, was determined.  Pendular political swings 
were caused by the distributional consequences of this volatile period of subsequent 
booms and busts.102 
Perhaps the boldest economic reforms yet imposed in Argentina began in the late 
1960s under Economic Minister Adalberto Kreiger Vasena of President Juan Carlos 
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Onganía government.  Kreiger implemented the denationalization of industries, the 
reduction of barriers to trade and the strict encouragement of increased efficiency in 
pursuit of an international comparative advantage in trade.  The Keynesian free-market 
reforms of Kreiger required significant state intervention and brought substantial social 
costs to certain sectors of the economy and to the state.  Wages decreased as profits 
soared in all sectors of the economy, with the exception of agriculture.103 Resistance to 
the strictly imposed reforms of the Onganía regime grew among working class members 
of less-incorporated labor movements.  The Cordobazo, a powerful anti-regime uprising, 
began in the 1960’s in response to the political stalemate between Onganía and 
colaboranista labor leaders, in which little was done to minimize the costs of reform on 
the working class.  The Cordobazo was a period marked by increasing militancy and well 
organized labor strikes that undermined the legitimacy of the increasingly authoritarian 
Onganía regime.  In the late 1960’s, dissidence was radicalized following the traditions of 
Peronismo and Marxism among university students and intellectuals.  The military 
became increasingly concerned by the weak Onganía regime and rising Marxist 
movements.  In 1970, a Military Junta replaced President Onganía with a centrist General 
Roberto Marcelo Levingston.104 The radical left continued to undermine the 
authoritarian regime, and Juan Peron briefly returned to the presidency in 1973, only to 
die the next year.  Claiming the threat of communist revolution, a conservative military 
Junta, supported by powerful economic interests, overthrew Peron’s third-wife Isabel 
from the presidency in 1976.   
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General Jorge Videla came to power with the expressed intent of destroying the 
perceived threat of communism and transforming the Argentine economy.  The military 
Junta practiced state repression and terrorism on a tremendous scale in order to eliminate 
political opponents, torturing and murdering thousands.  Official estimates of the 
“disappeared” victims of the “Guerra Sucia,” or dirty war, surpass 8,960, while other 
estimates are as high as 20,000.105 The Junta imposed Neoliberal economic reforms 
based on the opening of the economy to the world market and the strict adherence to the 
law of comparative advantage.  In the early 1980’s, a painful economic recession tested 
the coherence of the military regime, which responded by imposing even more austere 
reforms.  In a desperate political move to shift public tensions away from the economy, 
the armed forces invaded the British controlled Faulkland islands (Islas Malvinas) in 
1982.  The invasion failed as the British retook the islands several months later, further 
discrediting the military Junta.  The short-lived war brought spiraling national debt and 
near financial insolvency to be felt by future democratic governments.106 The inability of 
the military state to rule itself eventually brought the downfall of the authoritarian 
regime, more so than the mild resurgence of civil politics and in 1983 Argentina returned 
to civilian rule.107 
President Raul Alfonsin of the Radical Party replaced the military Junta through 
democratic elections in 1983.  The Alfonsin government sought to maintain stability in a 
nascent democracy by more or less maintaining the economic system inherited from the 
Junta while eradicating or reforming praetorian institutions.  Alfonsin’s government 
attempted to maintain legitimacy strictly by providing an end to political repression and 
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promoting human rights.  However, the regime was unable and seemingly uninterested in 
curbing ever-increasing inflation.  Weak stabilization plans were not obeyed by all 
elements of the government, and state banks maintained an expansionary monetary policy 
that further increased the price level.  Inflation led to capital flight as the US government 
discontinued its already lukewarm support as a potential lender of last resort for the 
Alfonsin regime in 1987.108 The political emphasis of the Radical Party under Alfonsin 
failed to recognize the importance of economic issues of price stability and investor 
confidence.  A new currency, the Austral, failed to ensure the confidence of currency 
markets.  The Alfonsin regime’s attempts to end inflation before the 1989 election were 
unsuccessful, as currency controls and price freezes reduced government revenue and 
failed to reduce inflation as they were largely ignored and a black market emerged in 
price controlled goods.  Alfonsin was replaced by Carlos Saul Menem of the Peronistas 
in the 1989 election.  Menem engaged the inherited problem of massive hyperinflation 
head on, personally declaring the need to transform Argentine capitalism.    The reforms 
initially had tremendous social costs, unemployment and income inequality surged as real 
GDP finished the decade down 26%.  However, reforms had real success in the following 
year, returning Argentina to positive GDP growth, significantly reducing inflation, and 
bringing back foreign capital.109 The successes were enough to guarantee victory for the 
Peronistas in the mid-term elections of 1991.  However, the longer-term benefits of 
reform would soon be undermined by exogenous economic shocks. 
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Liberal Reform Prior to the Crisis 
 
The instability of the late 1990’s is directly linked to the depth and political 
impact of Neoliberal reforms in the Argentine political economy.  In order to discuss the 
Argentine instability of the late 1990’s it is necessary to address the quantity and quality 
of Neoliberal reforms implemented before the crisis period.  The degree to which the 
state exerts control over the economy is an important variable determining the impact of 
the crisis as the state is forced to relinquish control to balance fiscal accounts and to 
receive the approval of international financial institutions.  In Argentina, there were three 
main periods of reform in the 20th century: the Keynesian free-market reforms of Kreiger 
in the late 1960’s, the rapid and forced reforms of the “New Political Economy” under 
the Junta of the 1970’s, and the reforms of Carlos Menem under the strain of 
hyperinflation in the late 1980’s and early 90’s. 
 In the late 1960’s, the liberalizing reforms of Onganía’s economic minister, 
Krieger, were moderate when compared to future reforms.  The reforms were designed to 
curb inflation through Argentina’s volatile economic cycles.  Krieger posited a 
compromised, Keynesian version of liberalizing reforms, in which the state consistently 
intervened to limit the cost of reform.  The reforms involved the denationalization of 
industries, the reduction in barriers of trade, intended to foster growth in the most 
efficient industries which were disproportionately owned by foreign interests.  Kreiger’s 
reforms led to an initial rate of growth fostered by inflows of foreign investment, as GDP 
growth shifted from -7.2 percent in 1966 to 21.4 percent in 1969.  By 1969, the Argentine 
cost of living was also reduced to a historic low.  The effects of the liberal policy reforms 
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were partially the result of the particular adeptness of Kreiger’s policies in returning 
growth and the purchasing power of wages while garnering the endorsement of 
international financial institutions and foreign bankers.  Yet Krieger’s reforms were 
ultimately undermined by the political ramifications of distributional consequences.  
Kreiger had promised that the reforms would not amount to the transfer of wealth from 
one sector to another, whereas the logical effects of his economic policies meant the 
transfer of wealth from industries protected by the state to industries connected to foreign 
markets.110 Disillusioned rural elites began to articulate a concern that their interests 
were being subordinated to that of the urban and financial sectors.  Argentina’s economic 
elite was divided by the distributional consequences of Krieger’s reforms, forcing 
Onganía to make significant policy compromises in order to maintain his ever-eroding 
domestic support.111 Krieger’s reforms came to an end, despite their general success, due 
to political conflict and the resulting Cordobazo.112 
Upon the acquisition of power by the military Junta of 1976, a doctrine of 
classical liberal orthodoxy was imposed, involving the forced opening of the economy to 
international competition.  The new economic minister, Jose Martinez de Hoz, rejected 
the Onganía reforms as insufficiently orthodox and proposed a “full test” of market 
theory espoused by University of Chicago economists and increasingly the IMF.113 
Martinez de Hoz rapidly eliminated subsidies designed to foster development in 
industrial sectors which were seen as unfairly biased against the interests of the Pampean 
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elite.  The transformation of the Argentine economy was further carried out by the 
elimination of administrative controls and the wholesale of state owned enterprises 
untouched by Krieger.  Wages were effectively reduced to about 40% to that of the five 
year average.  Export taxes on agricultural and livestock products were at once 
eradicated, and tariffs were progressively phased out by 50%.  State expenditure was 
greatly reduced by imposing sizable cut-backs in social welfare spending on health, 
education, and housing.  Overall, these policies were designed to achieve rapid deflation 
and long-run stabilization of prices following IMF-type prescriptions.114 The already 
deep recession was to be prolonged in order to eliminate inflation and to “rationalize” the 
productive structure of the Argentine economy.  Argentina’s public and private debt 
skyrocketed during this period, and would plague later democratic regimes. 
 The most important series of reforms came under the government of Carlos Saul 
Menem in response to the hyperinflation of Alfonsin.  After running on a fairly 
ambiguous platform of economic reforms, Menem set out to eliminate inflation through 
an economic austerity program.  Menem’s reforms immediately spurred a 
“hyperrecession,” entailing huge social costs while failing to reduce inflation.115 The 
curtailment of public-sector investments and the sale of inefficient publicly owned 
industries reduced aggregate demand, prolonging the recession despite drastically 
lowered interest rates.  This ineffective first round of Neoliberal reform had dramatic 
distributional consequences.  By the end of the 1980’s, the share of national income 
going to the top 10% increased to 46%, whereas the extremely poor grew to as much as 
40% of metropolitan Buenos Aires.  As stagnation persisted into the 1990s, threatening 
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the unity of Menem’s Peronista political support, Menem instated Domingo Felipe 
Cavallo as the new Economic Minister with the expressed intent of taking reforms even 
further.  Menem’s presidency seems to be the exception to the rule that economic policies 
in Argentina have been largely subordinated to political movements, as Menem was able 
to retain support for his stabilization programs despite internal political strife in the 
Peronista party.  Reforms were perceived to be necessary by nearly the entire political 
spectrum in the context of massive hyperinflation and negative GDP growth. 
 Upon assuming the economic ministry seat, Cavallo’s economic team benefited 
from the large foreign currency reserves that were the result of the effect of currency 
devaluations on the current account, which dramatically increased exports and decreased 
imports.  Cavallo’s plans to reform Argentine capitalism, known as the “Cavallazo,” 
included two main elements: the harsh treatment of organized labor, and the Peso 
Convertibility Plan.  Both of these strategies were legalized by congress.  Congress 
passed a bill making it illegal to participate in strikes in certain sectors of the economy 
deemed to be critical to Argentine recovery.  The value of the Peso was supported by law 
at a one to one ratio with the US dollar.  The controversial Convertibility Plan included 
11 main points.  First and foremost was the redefinition of the state and its role in the 
economy.  The Plan called for significant cuts in the public deficit vis-a-vis government 
spending cuts and the sale of deficit ridden state owned enterprises.  The state’s capacity 
to regulate was restricted and a number of central administrative jobs were cut.  A stand-
by agreement was arranged with the IMF, providing access to IMF credits and the US 
“Brady Plan,” securing a higher credit rating and lower interest rates from foreign banks.  
Many tax exemptions were eliminated and value-added taxes were increased. The other 
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main points of the Convertibility Plan were intended to decrease prices and improve 
production efficiency.  Further entry into the world economy allowed imports to act as a 
ceiling on domestic prices.  Legislation was passed limiting the compensation of 
occupational accidents and salaries were linked to productivity.   
 Further legislation limited the clout of unions and strengthened the bargaining 
power of employers.  Finally, the retirement system was overhauled, privatizing the 
pension system to eliminate the public debt occasioned by the bankruptcy of the major 
pension funds.116 Each of these policies had the effect of lowering prices.  By the 
end of the year, Cavallo’s Convertibility Plan reduced growth in consumer prices from 
27% to 3%, and one year interest rates fell from 44% to 22%.117 The large currency 
reserves enjoyed by Cavallo’s team allowed the Central Bank to guarantee the currency 
peg, cementing investor confidence.  As foreign capital flows returned to Argentina, 
economic growth finally rebounded, legitimizing the Menem government in time for the 
1991 mid-term elections in which the Peronists widened their majority in congress.118 
The control exercised over unions returned price flexibility to the Argentine economy.  
Deals were brokered with the capitalists of other industrial sectors in which tax breaks 
were granted in exchange for carefully coordinated price reductions.  The Convertibility 
Plan, successfully brought back foreign capital, fostering a 9% GDP growth rate by 
1992.119 Despite the initial success of Menem’s reforms, the failure to deepen fiscal 
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reforms left the economy vulnerable to a series of exogenous shocks in the mid and late 
1990’s.120 
Political Environment of Reform Periods 
 
In order to discuss the efficacy of Neoliberal reform during the crisis period of the 
late 1990’s, it is necessary to address the political environment during past reform 
periods.  The liberal economic reforms of the Onganía and Junta regimes occurred under 
bureaucratic authoritarian systems, while the reforms of Carlos Menem occurred under 
the guise of a nascent democracy.  Furthermore, the most recent round of reforms was 
executed by a Peronist regime, a party symbolic of populism and working-class interests. 
The economic reforms of 1967-69 and 1976 occurred under a political 
environment of bureaucratic authoritarianism, characterized by the exclusion of working-
class interests from the decision making process.  In each case, although to varying 
degrees, there was a perception among the political and economic elite of a threat to the 
existing social order in the form of leftist reform or even communist revolution.  In both 
cases, the bureaucratic authoritarian state came about in response to this perceived threat 
and with the ostensible goal of the “normalization” of the economy through a series of 
liberal reforms, which subsequently benefited those elites connected to transnational 
capital.121 During each period of reform, elites coercively controlled the decisive weight 
of institutions to suppress effective political democracy and to promote a pattern of 
capital accumulation biased in favor of oligopolistic units of private capital.  In this 
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environment, the “normalization” of the economy was pursued to further the interests of 
the ruling regime, whose monopoly of the connection to foreign capital further 
augmented and justified their local domination of economic and political resources.122 
A social order based on class exclusion became necessary in the eyes of the ruling 
elite benefiting from it, not for their own gain, but in pursuit of what had become the 
ultimate rhetorical goal, the liberal transformation of the economy.  In pursuit of this 
goal, class rhetoric was suppressed and the economic reform process was depoliticized, 
separating the link between the political interests and the distributional consequences of 
the reforms.  Not surprisingly, the economic reforms of Krieger and Martinez de Hoz, 
achieved their intended purpose of decreasing wages and salaries of lower-middle 
sectors, while increasing profits and salaries of upper-middle sectors across the board.123 
The one noted exception occurred in the more Keynesian minded reforms of Krieger, in 
which industrial production was favored over the interests of the Pampean bourgeoisie 
and agriculture was the one sector of the economy to experience decreasing profits.  
During the reforms of the Junta regime, profits in agriculture increased more than any 
other sector.124 
Following the collapse of the Junta, there was a genuine pursuit on the part of the 
elected Alfonsín government to democratize the institutions long-marked by 
authoritarianism.  The political influence of the Junta elite and the threat of a military 
coup remained major concerns for the Alfonsín and Menem regimes.  Democratization 
would require two processes: the subordination of the military to civil government and 
the elimination of the corporatist collusion of the Argentine economy through a transition 
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to a true open-market economy.125 The former was somewhat successfully pursued by 
the “human rights government” of Alfonsín, while the latter became the primary goal of 
the economic reforms of Carlos Menem.  The Alfonsín government successfully 
responded to the political crisis of democratic consolidation by destroying the old 
institutional framework of corporatism.  Several of the institutions of the Argentine 
government remained firmly in control of the military, and had to be fully dismantled 
before democracy could be fully pursued.  However, the economic policy of the Alfonsín 
government suffered remarkable failure.  In an attempt to produce economic growth 
despite a bloated and deficit-based public sector, the Alfonsín government pursued 
inflationary monetary policy, which resulted in massive hyperinflation and 
impoverishment by the end of his term in 1989.  Leading up to the elections of 1989, 
Argentina’s price level grew by an astounding 4,924 percent.126 Carlos Saul Menem ran 
in the presidential elections of 1989 as a Peronista, on a simple platform of ending the 
economic crisis triggered by the failure of the Radical party under Alfonsín. 
Once in office, Menem led the third major push in Argentine history to liberalize 
the economy, pushing through a series of sweeping reforms.  Himself a Peronista, 
Menem dismantled what remained of the neomercantilist state that had been instituted by 
the original Peronismo.  That Menem was willing to execute neoliberal reforms 
historically associated with the upper echelons of the bourgeoisie is explained by the 
extent of the hyperinflation and impoverishment in Argentina when he took office, and 
the international demonstrative factors that delegitimized any other option.  In the context 
of hyperinflation, Menem’s avowed goal of salariazo (slang for a large increase in 
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wages), was best achieved in real terms by restoring the purchasing power of wages 
through the eradication of inflation.  The spectacular global failure of communism and 
state led-development in Latin America and the apparent successes of economic 
liberalization in Chile served as crucial cognitive mechanisms reinforcing the perceived 
validity of Neoliberalism, not only among Argentine elites.127 These factors led Menem 
to pursue a path of radical economic liberalization, which would have striking and 
seemingly counterintuitive political consequences.   
The Peronista coalition now consisted of the lower classes faithful to the rhetoric 
of Peronismo and the economic elite who expected to benefit from Menem’s reforms, 
while the Radical party captured the majority of the middle class.  This shaky alliance of 
political poles was cohesive under the threat of further economic crisis, yet as the 
memory of the late 1980s receded and economic liberalization prolonged unemployment, 
public opinion began to clamor for “active employment policies.”128 
At the opposite pole, there was a push by economic elites to subordinate labor in 
pursuit of further reforms to prevent crisis and maximize profits.  The Menem 
government in particular cracked down significantly on the power of unions, outlawing 
strikes in particular sectors of the economy.129 This was an especially egregious law for 
many Argentines who associated organized demonstrations and protests with Peronismo.   
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The Argentine Crisis 
 
The Fernando de La Rua government inherited this polarized political discourse 
amidst a slowdown in economic growth.  A relatively conservative member of the Union 
Civica Radical, de La Rua continued many of the economic policies of his Peronista 
predecessor.  In 1998, Fernando de la Rua was positioned to replace Carlos Saul Menem 
as the president of Argentina.  He would inherit a currency pegged one to one with the 
US dollar and an economy seemingly on the mend.  The economy had weathered several 
damaging exogenous shocks, including the Mexican Peso Crisis and the East Asian 
Emerging Markets Crisis, and seemed to be rebounding.  GDP growth had been positive 
since the 1995 “Tequila Effect,” and capital inflows were on the upswing by 1998.130 
However, a third external shock in late 1998 and 1999 changed de la Rua’s fate, as a 
steep devaluation in Brazil’s Real significantly undermined the competitiveness of 
Argentina’s agricultural exports.  Argentina’s export earnings fell by 10% in the second 
half of 1998.  GDP fell by 3.5% in 1999, and a further 1% in 2000.  Unemployment 
achieved a staggering 15%.131 
De la Rua’s recovery strategy was to close a widening gap between government 
expenditures and revenues by increasing taxes and pushing through tough public-
spending cuts in the hopes of boosting the confidence of foreign investors.  In 2000, 
Argentina’s financial instability and mounting debt forced Economy Minister José Luis 
Machinea to try to rapidly eliminate debt and reassure the markets about the stability of 
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the Peso.  The Argentine government desperately tried to avoid default and capital flight 
by stopping payment on domestic liabilities, canceling or suspending state spending 
wherever possible.  In May of 2000, the government announced it would cut spending by 
$938 million.  In addition, the fuel tax was heightened in order to increase revenue.   
 On May 29th 2000, 20,000 marched to protest the simultaneous increase in taxes 
and decrease in services.  The only event to give the Argentine stock market a significant 
rebound that year was the announcement of a $40 billion financial aid package from the 
IMF.132 The contractionary policy move slowed growth and failed to lure foreign 
investors, as interest rates actually rose.  The spread between the Argentine sovereign 
debt and US Treasury Bills rose above 750 basis points in the early months of 2000, 
signaling a persistent lack of investor confidence in light of emerging market crisis in 
Russia and Brazil.133 Creeping economic misfortune and the strictly pegged currency 
brought sharp deflationary pressure on the Argentine economy in 2000.   
 The value and volume of Argentina’s exports continued to decline, as Brazil’s 
Real further devalued by 30% in 2001 in response to investor’s fears that Argentina 
would default on its sovereign debt.  At the same time, the U.S. dot com bubble burst, 
and the recession engulfed U.S. economy further diminished demand for Argentine 
exports and for the Peso.  The declining Real made Argentine exports relatively more 
expensive on world markets, decreasing the quantity demanded and severely hampering 
Argentina’s primary source of foreign currency reserves.  Argentina was hit especially 
hard by the devaluation of the Brazilean Real, and by 2001, de la Rua’s government 
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seemed trapped between two equally painful alternatives: to abandon the currency peg 
and devalue, or to default on it’s $132 billion in public debt. 
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Foreign exchange is critical both to service foreign debt denominated in foreign 
currency and to defend the pegged Peso against speculative attacks by currency traders.  
The lack of foreign exchange, rather than insurmountable debt, became the greatest 
weakness of the Argentine financial outlook.134 
In March of 2001, Economy Minister Machinea resigned, and Ricardo Lopez 
Murphy replaced him, only to announce a $4.45 billion austerity program with significant 
cuts in spending on education.  Lopez Murphy resigned on March 19th. The next day, de 
la Rua called for a national unity government and appointed successful and tough former 
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Economy Minister, Domingo Cavallo to replace Lopez Murphy.  Cavallo attempted to 
shield Argentine markets and industries by launching a tariff on financial transactions and 
increased tariffs to shield local firms.  Cavallo’s Competitiveness Plan modified the 
currency peg and enacted a debt swap of $30 billion, but these moves signaled weakness 
to international investors.  Things turned worse when Cavallo dipped his hands in the 
currency board, switching the peg to a weighted average of 50% dollars, 50% euros, 
which brought a 4% improvement on terms of trade to Argentine exporters.  However, 
the change led to fears of further devaluation, and a run on Argentine banks caused the 
loss of $8 billion in July of 2001.  The run on the banks caused a credit crunch, and GDP 
fell further from 6% to 12% year on year. 135 
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By this time, it had become clear that the currency peg was a liability.  The peg 
forced contractionary monetary and fiscal policy throughout a period of economic 
stagnation and declining demand.  At the same time, the removal of the peg in the context 
of currency devaluation in several other emerging market economies would have 
significantly undermined investor confidence and possibly provoked speculative attacks.  
The government repeatedly attempted to restructure the public debt without scaring away 
investors, launching a market-based, voluntary debt swap in June of 2001.  Argentina was 
forced on July 10th to pay the highest interest rates in five years on its short-term debt, 
and to raise money for the now increasingly expensive debt servicing, the federal 
government announced that the provinces would have to immediately slash all deficits to 
zero, and eliminate any debt.  Later that month the economy was brought to a near 
standstill by a massive strike in protest to the spending cuts and the failure of provincial 
governments to pay public sector wages.  Unemployed or unpaid protestors, known as 
‘piqueteros,’ took to the streets of Buenos Aires.  Despite this and later debt swaps, 
Argentina’s credit risk rating hit new record highs, and capital both foreign and domestic 
began streaming out of the country.136 In a last ditch effort to end capital flight, Cavallo 
announced the sweeping restrictions on withdrawals and fund transfers abroad that would 
bring violent street protests.   
 In November of 2001, the authorities made further efforts to restructure debt 
domestically, exchanging peso and dollar denominated bonds for domestic guaranteed 
loans with an interest payment grace period until April of 2002.  The crisis fell into free 
fall in late November, triggered by a further domestic run on banks.  In the final three 
 
136 (“Timeline: Argentina’s Financial Crisis.” 2001) 
79
days of November, 6% of the deposit base of Argentine banks was withdrawn, and the 
authorities responded with draconian controls on banking and foreign exchange 
transactions.137 Authorities extended controls to include a limit on withdrawals of 250 
pesos from individual bank accounts in what would be known as “el corralito.”  Banks 
were prohibited from granting loans on pesos and foreign exchange controls were placed 
on traveling expenses and cross-border money transfers.  Civilians responsed to el 
corralito with street protests and riots. On December 13th, a 24 hour general strike was 
held protesting the banking restrictions and the delayed payout of state pension funds.  
On December 20th, at least 25 people were killed during violent street protests and 
rioting, and President Fernando de la Rua resigned.  Economic activity collapsed in late 
2001, as industrial production fell by 18% almost overnight.  Tax revenue plummeted by 
17%, further undermining the governments already deteriorating fiscal outlook.  On 
December 23rd, the interim President Adolfo Rodriguez Saa declared the default of 
government debt and called presidential elections within 60 days. 138 By 2002, GDP per 
capita had bottomed out at $10,690 measured in purchasing power parity, and the 
percentage of porteños living in poverty increased temporarily above 50%.139 
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Conclusion  
 
Argentina’s economic reforms of the early nineties were undermined by regional 
inconsistencies, leaving the economy greatly indebted and vulnerable to the exogenous 
shocks of the late 1990s.  The Argentine case demonstrates that some political 
environments may not be conducive to liberalizing economic reforms. Argentina’s 
reforms did not enjoy the political support necessary to make them viable, thereby 
rendering monetary and fiscal adjustments ineffective and undermining the currency peg.  
Menem’s government lacked the kind of common political front necessary to ensure 
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policy consistency.  In the relatively decentralized Argentine government, Argentina’s 
economic policy makers did not enjoy the authority to formulate a unified monetary and 
fiscal policy capable of defending the currency peg and solidifying Argentina’s financial 
position.  Argentina is a clear example of the dangers of indebtedness and the importance 
of maintaining the confidence of the international financial community.  Investor 
confidence is best maintained by consistency and transparency.  While Argentina’s 
various Economic Ministers attempted to minimize the sovereign debt in the form of 
short-term notes, the drastic measures taken to restructure the government debt during the 
throngs of crisis further undermined investor confidence in the Peso.  In conclusion, the 
Argentine case highlights the importance of certain political prerequisites for reform such 
as a degree of centralization.  Other important policy implications of this case include the 
consistency and transparency of policies, the minimization of debt, and the accumulation 
of a stability fund and currency reserves. 
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Chapter Six 
 
The Chilean Case 
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Introduction 
 
The economic performance and political outcomes of Chile in the late 1990s 
provides a useful comparison to the Argentine case.  During this period, Chile 
experienced similar external economic shocks, and the political climate was, while not 
identical, very similar.  Although Chile experienced a mild economic slowdown, 
financial and political stability were more or less maintained.  Unlike Argentina, Chile 
remains a Latin American success story for free-market economic reforms and 
democratic governance.  In order to discuss the crisis period in depth, a brief history of 
Chilean political economy will be given.  Two important variables will be highlighted in 
the period leading up to the crisis: the degree to which the economy had undergone 
market liberating reforms prior to the crisis and the degree to which the political decision 
making process was inclusive.  Ultimately, I will use the Chilean case as a counterpoint 
to the Argentine case in order to draw conclusions about the efficacy of the Neoliberal 
stabilization policies. 
 
History 
 
Chile’s geographic position along the ocean and plentiful natural resource 
endowment provided the impetus for export-led economic growth in the 19th century.  
Minerals such as copper, along with organic nitrates such as guano, remained staples of 
the Chilean economy.  By the mid-19th century, Chile had established significant trade 
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contacts with the British Empire, and Chile had become known for maintaining 
governance in Western European style, marked by a powerful central legislature.  During 
the late 19th century, the power of the Chilean Congress increased dramatically.  The 
invention of synthetic nitrates in the 1920s brought economic slowdown and political 
upheaval to what had been a prosperous and stable 19th century.  In 1920, Arturo 
Alessandri took office in the context of increasing calls from the Left for a more active 
presidency who would provide a stable hand in the economy’s transition away from 
nitrates.  The idea of an active president was met with stiff opposition from conservatives 
who controlled Congress.  In 1924, a group of young military officers staged a coup.  
Alessandri was forced to resign, and control of the government was taken over by a 
military junta.  It would be the first time since Chile’s independence that the military 
would control the national government.140 
Within the military authority, incongruity soon arose as more conservative senior 
officials disagreed with the reformist agenda of the young officers who carried out the 
coup.  Alessandri was asked to return to the presidency by senior military officials in 
January of 1925.  Out of the deal, a new constitution was established in which 
presidential powers were actually increased.  Alessandri did not return to office, and in 
1927, Alessandri’s ineffective successor was replaced democratically by Colonel Carlos 
Ibanez, himself one of the young military officers responsible for the coup of 1924.  
Ibanez led reforms to curb the power of the traditional political parties, yet his political 
capital ran dry during the catastrophic economic effects in Chile of the American 
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depression.141 Support for Ibanez’s reforms among agricultural and mining elites 
dwindled as commodity prices fell.  Chile’s exports dropped to a fifth of their former 
value almost overnight.  Unrest mounted in the streets as unemployment surged and real 
wages plummeted.142 A brief period of political instability ensued in which a 90 day 
“Socialist Republic” was established by a civil-military political coalition.   
 As the socialist coalition failed to yield results to a demanding public, Arturo 
Alessandri returned to power in 1932 to restore economic growth.  In this second term, 
Alessandri brought the country out of the depression with transformative austerity 
measures designed to shift the economy away from dependency on the traditional export 
commodities.  The success of president Alessandri reaffirmed Chile’s belief in 
democratic values as they were being challenged in Europe and in neighboring countries.  
In 1938, the Radical Pedro Aguirre Cerda was elected president with the support of a 
broad coalition which included the centrist Popular Front and the Marxist left.  Despite 
stiff opposition from the right, Cerda expanded Chile’s social-welfare policies, 
encouraging the growth of unions and promoting import substitution industrialization to 
further diminish the impact of export prices.  Although, Chile’s economic elites strongly 
objected to collective bargaining at the workplace, they began to accept the legitimacy of 
working class interests in democratic political institutions.143 By 1952, the growing 
popularity of the Chilean Communist Party began to worry the Socialists, Radicals, and 
conservatives alike.  Newly-elected president Gabriel Gonzalez Videla outlawed 
membership in the Communist Party, sending many of its leaders to detention camps.  As 
the traditional parties struggled to produce a platform that appealed to the rapidly 
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changing class dynamics of Chile’s population, Ibanez returned to power in late 1952 on 
an anti-party platform, only to struggle without the support of the main parties.  In order 
to regain support from the center-right, Ibanez was forced to shift once populist programs 
into a severe austerity plan in which wages and salaries temporarily declined.  By the end 
of the 1950’s, Chilean politics became increasingly polarized, defying one hundred years 
of moderation and compromise in Chile’s democracy.  In 1958, Arturo Alessandri’s son 
and conservative businessman, Jorge Alessandri edged out Socialist Salvador Allende by 
only 2.7% of the vote.144 
The politics of Chile up to this time were marked by regular fluctuations in 
popularity for the Left driven by calls for real wage increases.  As true majorities were 
impossible to achieve, Chile’s presidents invariably turned to building broad governing 
coalitions of the center and whichever segment of the political spectrum, the left or the 
right, currently enjoyed popular sentiment.  Between presidential elections, these 
coalitions quickly broke down as economic conditions changed and as real policy 
decisions had to be made.  While a picture is painted of a polarized and excessively 
competitive political landscape, Chilean politics prior to the 1970’s was marked by a 
relatively high level of compromise and a strong respect for the principles of democracy 
in key institutions which served to moderate disagreements.    
 In the early 1970’s, popular discontent and political polarization grew as 
economic austerity measures failed to temper inflation and spur real wage growth.  As 
discontent escalated, fears among the center and right of the growing clout of the extreme 
left began to breakdown compromises across party lines.  Fear of the left led traditionally 
extreme right parties to join the center in backing Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democrat 
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party.  Frei enjoyed massive financial assistance from the United States, and the Christian 
Democrats instigated far-reaching economic reforms.  However, these reforms failed to 
ensure the tacit agreement with the parties of the extreme right, and Frei’s popularity and 
effectiveness diminished.  As the ruling coalition of the center right splintered, and 
amidst growing popular cries for the restoration of real wages, the Left backed Salvador 
Allende.  This time, Allende enjoyed the broad support of his Popular Unity coalition 
which united the moderate and extreme left.  In the elections of 1970, Allende received 
the most votes with only 36.2% of the electorate.  The Christian Democrats had failed to 
develop a dominant coalition representing the moderate center, and Salvador Allende 
went head to head against the rightist Jorge Alessandri.  Allende defeated Alessandri by 
merely 1.3% of the vote.145 
Allende’s election brought an extreme reaction domestically and in Washington 
by those who saw Allende as potentially pro-Moscow.  Political pressure from 
Washington surged leading up to the election of 1970 as the government of Richard 
Nixon invested millions of dollars in the Christian Democrat party.  Allende’s UP 
coalition believed, just as the US supported Christian Democrat party had before him, 
that state resources and power should be used to redistribute wealth and stimulate the 
Chilean economy in order to bring about an increase in the real wage.  Allende’s self 
declared “Socialist Revolution” called for a more aggressive redistribution than had been 
pursued by past regimes, and expansionary monetary and fiscal policy brought increasing 
inflation.  Furthermore, private businesses were brought under state control, undermining 
a legal system founded on private property and alienating Chile’s corporate sector.  As 
outright expropriation further impacted the profitability of small businesses, this move by 
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Allende also alienated much of Chile’s middle and working class.  The Union Popular 
attempted to broaden its coalition in the face of “sabotage, subversion, and foreign 
intrigue,” but centrist political groups advocated for narrower group stakes.146 
Traditionally apolitical institutions, such as the courts, were pulled into the increasingly 
polarized debate, thereby losing there important role in moderating political struggle.  In 
addition, military officials began to vocalize their political opinions, and politics became 
increasingly confrontational.  The middle ground was further undermined by US 
policymakers, who aimed to destroy the perceived legitimacy of leftism, associated at the 
time with Communist Russia, by crippling the Chilean economy and bolstering the anti-
democratic opposition.  Despite the ineffective state of democracy during the increasingly 
polarized partisan conflicts of the early 1970’s, most Chileans remained in favor of 
democratic policies as surveys taken weeks prior to the military coup suggest.147 
In 1973, the Chilean military staged a violent coup, bringing to power only the 
third undemocratic government in Chile’s post-independence history.  The military junta 
did not merely aim to replace a failed democratic government with another more 
successful one, but rather, to transform Chilean society and to attack the perceived threat 
of Communist subversives.  The legitimacy of the Pinochet regime, as was also the case 
during the Argentine junta, was precipitated by the perceived threat of Leftist revolution.  
The leaders of the various branches of the military that made up the Junta immediately 
sought to destroy the traditional political parties responsible for the rise to power of 
Salvador Allende.  The Junta’s expressed goal was to “cleanse” society of all those 
“unpatriotic,” or anyone opposed to it’s political and economic vision of radical, 
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conservative change.148 Military units were brought in to working and middle class 
neighborhoods to “clean up,” or eliminate those associated with the parties of the Left.  
Thousands of party leaders, trade-union officials and political activists were arrested, 
exiled, tortured and killed.  While the official count of those killed by the junta regime 
number 2,279, it is much more likely that in excess of 3,000 were killed by the state 
through politically motivated disappearances.149 Under military dictatorship, political 
stability was ensured through a combination of coercive control and institutional support, 
as military officials were given benefits unheard of during previous civil governments in 
exchange for their support or complacency.  General Augusto Pinochet of the Chilean 
army rose as the most politically astute of the military leaders.  Pinochet gave the secret 
police, or DINA, ever increasing powers to silence opposition.  DINA became infamous 
for carrying out a series of high profile assassinations of vocal critics of Pinochet both at 
home and abroad.  The only remaining opposition to General Pinochet by 1975 was 
Admiral Gustavo Leigh Guzmán, the commander of naval forces.  Pinochet strengthened 
his grip on Chilean politics by leading a power play with the two other heads of military 
branches to forcibly and illegally remove Leigh from office in what has been called, a 
“coup within a coup.”150 Leigh’s removal from the scene formalized Pinochet’s 
unilateral authority, effectively transforming the junta regime into a government of one. 
 Pinochet used this opportunity to enact widespread Neoliberal economic reforms.  
Led by Milton Friedman, the IMF was called in to advise the process of rationalizing the 
trade and fiscal accounts, privatizing state owned enterprises, and opening up to 
international trade.  The macroeconomic reforms did not immediately yield positive 
 
148 (Valenzuela 1999, 222) 
149 (Valenzuela 1999, 223) 
150 (Valenzuela 1999, 225) 
90
results on inflation, instead the poverty rate greatly increased as Pinochet cut spending on 
health, welfare, and education.  A moderate revival in economic growth, combined with 
Pinochet’s often-exploited monopoly on the use of force allowed him to maintain control 
throughout the 1970’s.  Chile’s traditional political parties were unable to reassert their 
political voice despite the extremely costly reform process, until 1982 brought a 
significant decline in the Chilean economy.  Pinochet’s economic policies prior to 1983 
did not facilitate easy adjustments to market fluctuations, and Chile’s foreign debt began 
to spiral out of control.151 GDP declined by 14.3% in 1982 alone.  Unemployment, 
which had yet to recover from Pinochet’s reforms which wiped out noncompetitive 
industries, surged above 30% by the end of 1982.152 The percentage of Chileans living in 
poverty had doubled since the coup of 1973, increased to more than 38% in 1983.  
Widespread protests became uncontrollable through the regimes traditional methods of 
selective political violence and intimidation.153 Massive unemployment and violent 
repression drove labor leaders to launch a resurgence of party politics.  Influential voices 
from the right began to warn that if Pinochet did not speed up his proposed schedule for 
the return to democracy, than Chile could become ungovernable.  Pinochet responded by 
declaring a plebiscite, yes or no vote, on his mandate to govern the country for 1988.  The 
revival of radical opposition to the economic interests represented by Pinochet, namely 
the Communist Party, was hampered by the fear and negative connotation that Chileans 
had developed for confrontational politics.  While the surviving members of the 
Communist Party continued to oppose any deal brokered with General Pinochet, most 
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Chileans by this point simply wanted a non-violent return to democracy.  By 1987, it had 
become clear to most of the traditional political parties that acknowledging Pinochet’s 
own sponsored plebiscite on military rule was their best shot at restoring democracy.  
There was a pull to the center from both sides of the political spectrum, in which both left 
and right revived Chile’s long established tradition of compromise in order to end 
military rule.  The now unified parties launched a massive grassroots campaign to counter 
the use of fear and intimidation on the part of the junta.  In 1988, 97% of registered 
Chileans showed up to vote.  The opposition parties won a surprise victory, winning by a 
margin of 12% over General Pinochet.154 A massive national and international campaign 
to ensure fairness and democratic processes provided resources to monitor the election. 
 The opposition leadership that emerged victorious from the plebiscite now faced 
the dilemma of how to dismantle the praetorian aspects of Chile’s political institutions 
without provoking renewed military intervention in politics.  A compromise was reached 
between the opposition, military leaders, and rightist politicians in which the 1980 
constitution established under Pinochet was maintained in exchange for 54 amendments 
designed to eliminate the more egregiously undemocratic elements.  On July 30th, 1989,
the new constitution was ratified by an astounding 85.7% margin.  In December, Patricio 
Aylwin of the Christian Democrat party defeated Pinochet’s former minister of finance, 
restoring to democracy for the first time in 16 years.155 
The Christian Democrats formed a broad coalition of centrist parties dedicated to 
the revival of democracy, known as the concertación.  While Pinochet had been removed 
from the head of government, he remained head of the armed forces until 1998, and many 
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of his economic policies were maintained by subsequent democratic governments.  
Pinochet’s radical austerity programs had brought increased poverty and unemployment, 
while the more flexible reforms of the post 1983 period began to yield some benefits to 
efficiency of tax collection, and the Chilean current account was balanced.  Many 
Chileans desired increased spending on basic services.  However, they were able to 
witness the economic benefits of the open market reforms implemented under Pinochet 
prior to the transition to democracy.  Upon taking office in 1989, President Aylwin 
expanded the Neoliberal reforms enacted under the reign of the junta.  The leaders of the 
concertación affirmed that a free market economy was not incompatible with greater 
social equality.156 The political environment of cooperation and the looming threat of a 
return to dictatorship, epitomized by General Pinochet’s position as head of the armed 
forces, facilitated the reform process despite its perceived costs.157 
By 1991, Chile’s fiscal accounts had been rationalized, and tax collection made 
more efficient.  The financial groundwork had been laid for a revival of social spending, 
which was increased by 20% over the final days of the military junta.  While inequality 
remained high in Chile, increased spending on education and health made a significant 
dent in poverty in the early 1990’s.158 The breadth and depth of freemarket reforms 
achieved by Pinochet and later democratic governments set the stage for export-led 
growth fed by massive inflows of foreign capital.  From 1991 to 1997, Chile enjoyed 
average GDP growth rates in excess of 7%, and per capita real income increased by more 
than 50%.  The percentage of Chileans living in poverty fell from 39% in 1990 to 23% in 
1996.  Significant cohesion within the political parties also allowed president Aylwin to 
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address the demands for official accounts of the human rights abuses committed under 
military rule, and despite the maintenance of certain non-democratic elements in the 
Chilean government.  The negative memory of dictatorship provided Aylwin and his 
predecessor Eduardo Frei with a unique opportunity to pursue costly reforms without 
radical political backlash.159 
Chile’s growing economic stability and prosperity, and the acclaimed successes of 
president Aylwin allowed the centrist coalition of the Christian Democrat party to win the 
1993 presidential election to replace Aylwin.  Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei Ruiz 
Tagle garnered an impressive 58.1% of the vote, as the more leftist parties of the 
concertación gained seats in the congressional contest.  The Frei administration generally 
continued the successful economic policies of the Aylwin regime.  Chile’s fiscal 
responsibility continued to provide record levels of foreign direct investment, while 
further diminishing inflation, and restoring the relative value of wages.  Frei continued 
his predecessors popular tradition of massive government expenditures designed to 
improve infrastructure and human capital in order to support growth in the private 
sector.160 It would not be until the East Asian crisis of 1997-98 that Chile experienced an 
economic downturn. 
 
Neoliberal Reform prior to the Crisis Period 
 
Prior to the 1970’s, Chile’s economic policy remained largely dominated by the 
import substitution industrialization.  Yet Chile was one of the first developing countries 
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in which Neoliberalism was seriously adopted as an economic stabilizer.  Upon coming 
to power, Pinochet was heavily pressured, both by conservative business leaders 
domestically, and by international financial institutions, especially the IMF, to adopt 
Neoliberal reforms as a way to minimize inflation and bring export-led economic growth.  
Pinochet’s rise to power coincided with the rise of Neoliberalism as the dominant 
economic doctrine of IFI’s and the US Treasury department.  Following the coup of 
1973, General Pinochet’s intended transformation of Chilean society came to be largely 
defined by a series of sweeping Neoliberal reforms.  General Pinochet greatly reduced the 
ability of the state to intervene in the economy, privatizing and deregulating state owned 
enterprises, severely restricting public spending on social programs in order to balance 
fiscal accounts, and generally enforcing strict adherence to the rule of comparative 
advantage in trade.  These macroeconomic reforms were enacted, at times, virtually 
overnight under the unequivocal authority of the junta regime.  External shocks 
diminished prices of crucial export commodities at the same time as contractionary 
macroeconomic policies reduced aggregate demand and social safety nets.   
 The result was massive increases in the rates of unemployment and poverty.  
From 1970 to 1980, unemployment increased from 5.9% to 16.9%, peaking at 31.3% in 
the recession and debt crisis of 1983.  Despite the high social cost, Pinochet’s reforms 
were markedly successful at curbing inflation, and between 1970 and 1983 inflation fell 
from 36.1% to 12.9%.  This occurred at a time when many Latin American countries 
were experiencing massive hyperinflation.161 While Pinochet was politically capable of 
ignoring or eliminating left-leaning opposition to his costly orthodox reforms prior to 
1983, the debt crisis of that year brought a severe economic downturn that brought calls 
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from all segments of society for changes to be made to the reform policies.  The 
liberalizing reforms undertaken after the 1983 crisis were specifically designed to fluidly 
adjust to market fluctuations.  It was this second round of macroeconomic reforms that 
paved the way for significant growth and minimal inflation that would last until well after 
Pinochet’s departure from office.162 The privatization of the health sector was one of the 
most dramatic changes enacted by Pinochet, which at once eliminated the ability of many 
Chileans to access health services in order to help balance the states fiscal accounts.  
Such reforms were responsible for massive increases in inequality, as family incomes 
decreased under Pinochet’s 16 year reign in all but the wealthiest 20% of households.163 
The effects of Pinochet’s austerity program, combined with the recession of 1983 were 
enough to provoke a revival of civil politics despite the tremendous threat of state 
repression, torture and execution.  At the end of the Pinochet regime, the percentage of 
Chileans living in extreme poverty had increased from 17% to 38%.  The illiteracy rate, 
once one of the lowest in the Western Hemisphere, had increased to 6%.164 As 
opportunities eroded in the formal sector, there was a massive expansion of the informal 
economy which diminished government revenue.  By 1988, only 45% of working 
Chileans contributed to the social security system.165 
Despite the tremendous costs, the Pinochet regime established structural 
conditions that facilitated growth and stability under later governments.  In contrast to the 
economic conditions encountered by neighboring nascent democracies, Chile’s new 
democratic government entered the scene after the benefits of Neoliberal reform had 
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already begun to materialize.  Furthermore, macroeconomic imbalances were under 
control, and increased administrative efficiency had begun to provide increased tax 
revenue.  The liberalization of foreign trade had gone especially well in the post 1983 
period, as high prices for Chile’s staple agricultural and mining commodities fueled 
economic growth. Chile was naturally competitive in a few key export commodities, such 
as copper.  The process of diversifying into other industries by transferring capital 
accumulated in naturally competitive industries into newly developing industries.  
Because the Neoliberal reforms undertaken following the 1983 crisis were broadly seen 
as responsible for the successful economic recovery, Aylwin’s democratic government 
came to power with an established consensus in favor of the Neoliberal view of the 
proper function of the state in the market.166 Under the Aylwin regime, Chile’s general 
export orientation was maintained.  In an effort to further reap the benefits of 
globalization, Aylwin reduced tariffs and joined free trade agreements with other Latin 
American countries.  New incentives were established encouraging productive flows of 
long-term, foreign direct investment.  The positive momentum of Chile’s economy 
hastened under democratic rule, as industrial production increased by more than 5% in 
1991.  Chile’s export sector was especially vibrant, and the trade balance rose to a surplus 
of $500 million.  Foreign direct investment continued to surge, and unemployment fell 
further to 6%.  The Neoliberal reforms of Aylwin’s democratic regime were distinct from 
those of General Pinochet, in that massive amounts of social spending was used to 
generate improvements to human capital, and social safety nets were extended to those 
most impoverished.  While the center left was a dominant force in post-Pinochet Chile, 
conservative economic elites remained a disproportionately large force in Chile’s 
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primarily but not entirely democratic politics.  This balance ensured that the necessary 
macroeconomic reforms would be pursued without ignoring the social costs that could be 
potentially destabilizing.  Leftist elements of Aylwin’s concertacion were instrumental in 
a push to repeal some of the more repressive aspects of the military regime labor policies, 
which when combined with a decline in inflation from 27% to 18%, led to an increase in 
the average real wage by 6% in 1991.167 It should be noted that participants in the 
informal sector did not benefit from newly adopted labor legislation such as the minimum 
wage, working condition regulations and spending on temporary social safety nets.  
However, as unemployment rapidly decreased it can be inferred that more workers from 
the informal sector were returning to jobs in the formal economy.   
 One of the first major reforms enacted under democratic government was a series 
of improvements to the efficiency of tax collection in 1990.  Aylwin hoped to continue to 
improve administrative efficiency and to include more workers in the process in order to 
provide more government revenue to be distributed in the form of social spending.  
Aylwin’s reforms provided a significant increase in government revenue, amounting to 
2% of GNP in 1991, which enabled dramatic increases in government expenditures on 
health, housing, education, and infrastructure without negatively impacting the fiscal 
account which would bring inflation, debt, and discourage foreign investment.  Between 
1989 and 1995, government social spending rose by 50% in real terms.168 The Fondo de 
Solidaridad e Inversion Social was a particularly innovative social program funded with 
resources gained from improved tax collection methods.  The Fondo was designed to 
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target the absolute poorest communities and to bring those who turned to the informal 
sector during the austerity programs of Pinochet back into the formal economy.  Social 
policies of the democratic governments that followed Pinochet were primarily focused on 
improving human capital and infrastructure to improve competitiveness.  As a result, the 
distribution of income was made more equitable during the course of the Neoliberal 
reforms pursued by the new democracies.  The percentage of income going to the 
wealthiest quintile fell from 59.9% in 1989 to 54.7% in 1991, and the poverty rate fell 
from 40% to 28% in the same year.169 Chile’s favorable factor endowments and 
institutional tradition of democratic values set the stage for successful reforms.  
Furthermore, the effective leaders that emerged with the collapse of military rule 
successfully recognized that under a democratic government, economic growth would 
have to be coupled with a measure of equity, and the social costs of further Neoliberal 
reforms would have to be managed.  Yet despite this successful push for equity and 
government expenditures on human capital, positive fiscal account balances were more or 
less maintained throughout the reform period.   
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The Concertación alliance that continued under President Eduardo Frei was 
uniquely positioned to follow the economic liberalization of General Pinochet and 
President Aylwin while simultaneously working to improve social indicators.170 
Political Environment during Reform Periods 
 
Between 1973 and 1989, the Military Junta ruled Chile through a combination of 
coercive control over the political opposition and institutionalized support of loyal 
groups, especially within the military.  The Neoliberal reforms achieved under the rule of 
the military junta were facilitated by Pinochet’s personal, highly coercive domination of 
politics through institutionalized authoritarianism.171 The political decision making 
process was controlled by Pinochet’s personal advisors and economic managers that 
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keenly represented the interests of Chilean elites and foreign capitalists.  The Junta’s 
transformative economic model was the reverse of the import substitution 
industrialization model used during the 1960’s and ‘70’s, and was named, the “New 
Model of Outward Development.”172 According to this model, market principles were 
established as the absolute governing force of the Chilean economy, as Pinochet himself 
was the absolute governing authority in Chilean politics.  The business organizations and 
middle class professional groups that had played a vital role in the fall of the Union 
Popular of Salvador Allende were not given access to the decision making process that 
guided the reforms of the junta.173 Instead, excluded middle income groups remained 
loyal to the regime because they viewed the military as the only viable alternative to the 
leftist radicalism that had evolved out of the democratic system.  Although similar to the 
bureaucratic authoritarianism experienced by Argentina from 1976 to 1982, Pinochet’s 
military government achieved a greater degree of centralized authority.  In turn, this 
control enabled him to broaden and deepen Neoliberal reforms to a greater degree.  
 The military regime institutionalized its authority by establishing formal rules that 
justified and solidified the authority of the military over other groups.  Where legal rules 
could not be adjusted to suit Pinochet, they were simply thrown out or ignored.  Judicial 
protection could not be sought, and the population was encouraged to report and 
denounce any “disloyal” individuals.174 By 1980, absolute authority was further 
concentrated under the personal figure of General Pinochet through the elimination of 
adversaries within the military and the adoption of a new constitution.  Under military 
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dictatorship, the political decision making process was highly exclusive.  The right to 
participate in the limited economic policy debate of this first reform period was extended 
only to the politically loyal members of the military and to the conservative economic 
advisers that supported the transformative macroeconomic vision of Pinochet and the 
IMF.175 
Following the plebiscite of 1989, Chile underwent a process of redemocratization 
in which long-established democratic norms were revived.176 Chile’s transition back to 
consensus-based politics was facilitated by the surviving memory among many Chileans, 
especially the leaders of the old traditional parties, of democratic institutions and values.  
However, despite the stunning resurgence of democracy in the early 1990’s, major 
elements of the 1980 constitution that ran counter to democratic principles remained.  
Most blatantly, General Pinochet remained the head of the armed forces until 1998.  
Special privileges for the military were maintained, including the critical direct 
appointments allowed military officials in the otherwise elected national legislature.  The 
military enjoyed tutelary powers in politics, and the president did not posses the power to 
of appointment and removal of the heads of the various branches of the armed forces 
which would fully subordinate the military to the civil government.  The extremely high 
defense budget was maintained at or above the level of the last year of dictatorship.  The 
military intelligence agency, DINA, which played a dominant role in the political 
repression and human rights abuses committed under Pinochet, remained under the guise 
of Pinochet.177 The most meaningfully undemocratic aspects of the post-dictatorship 
governments were the heavily biased electoral formula and the presence of the Pinochet-
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designated members of the senate, which continued to affect the policies of an otherwise 
fully representative government.178 
The undemocratic elements that remained in Chile’s political decision making 
process facilitated the further implementation of macroeconomic Neoliberal reforms in 
two ways.  One, the fear of resumed military rule provided an incentive for political 
parties with divergent opinions to compromise on maintaining the current path of export-
led, open-market economics.  Two, the political and economic interests represented by 
the military’s disproportionate political voice were largely from the right, and supported 
the continuation the macro reforms pursued under Pinochet.  The legacy and threat of 
military rule led to compromise and the political coherence of the Concertación that 
facilitated broader and deeper economic reforms.179 At the same time, the relatively 
more inclusive decision making processes achieved under presidents Aylwin and Frei 
facilitated the broadening of reforms and allowed middle and working class interests to 
play a bigger role, so long as they were more or less inline with the law of comparative 
advantage and economic efficiency.  Furthermore, political openness ensured that social 
spending would be used to improve human capital and to pursue a more equitable 
distribution of wealth.   
 
The Crisis Period 
 
The East Asian Crisis of the late 1990’s tested Chile’s reputation as a model of 
free-market economic reform and democratization.  The East Asian Crisis threatened 
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Chile’s economy in much the same way as Argentina’s.  Much of Chile’s export 
commodities were destined for Asian markets, and Chile’s economy remained dependent 
on the inflow of foreign capital that had poured in following the economic liberalization 
of Pinochet.  While Chile had dramatically lowered the percentage of export revenue 
generated from copper in the two decades prior to the crisis, by the mid nineties copper 
still comprised 45% of export earnings.180 Chile’s export-led growth and shifting trading 
patterns made it especially vulnerable to declining Asian demand.  The search for new 
markets of the Aylwin and Frei administrations, shifted more and more of Chile’s exports 
from the US and Europe to the rapidly growing economies of East Asia, where raw 
materials such as copper were in heavy demand.  In 1997, 33% of Chile’s $17 billion of 
exports were destined for East Asia.  In Chile, the potential economic ramifications of the 
East Asian Crisis were catastrophic.  From June of 1997 until May of 1998, the average 
world price of copper fell dramatically from $1.19 a pound to 75 cents.  Chile’s 
dependency on copper exports meant that a one cent reduction in the price of copper 
would mean a loss of export revenue for Chile of $65 million.181 The already negative 
current account took a turn for the worse, and Chile’s exchange rate came under 
significant pressure.  GDP turned sour by the end of 1997, bottoming out at -4% annual 
growth in the third quarter of 1998.  Unemployment nearly doubled in 1998, temporarily 
surging above 10%.182 
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The political ramifications of the 1998 economic downturn were minimal, and 
fiscal account balances were maintained.  Discontent was especially mild from the Left, 
as massive increases in social spending, particularly on health and education gained 
President Eduardo Frei political capital with Chile’s Left-leaning organizations.  
Furthermore, the memory and political vestiges of conservative dictatorship in the 
legislature made center-left groups less quick to express discontent with the economic 
performance of Frei’s center-left Concertación government.  Criticisms for Frei’s 
economic policy came from the Right, particularly from supporters of General Pinochet, 
who stressed that the democratic governments of Aylwin and Frei had eroded Chile’s 
“international competitiveness and fiscal virtue.”183 Conservative critics further claimed 
that the government should have more aggressively tightened fiscal spending to lower 
inflation, rather than relying on the strength of the Peso to bolster spending on social 
programs.  Concerns over political and economic instability intensified as capital flight 
and political violence arose in neighboring Argentina in 1999. 
 Yet the recession was short-lived in Chile.  By 1999 GDP returned to a positive 
4% growth rate, and unemployment gradually began to decline.184 Chile’s GDP growth 
rate remained one of the most stable throughout Latin America.  
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Latin American Slowdown
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The impressive recovery of the East Asian economies, combined with Chile’s 
fiscal responsibility throughout the recession brought renewed demand and foreign 
investment.  Chile was perhaps the best prepared of any country in the region for an 
exogenous economic shock.  During the crisis, Chile benefited greatly from its well 
organized budgetary institutions, consistent fiscal surpluses since the fall of Pinochet, and 
tight banking supervision.185 Chile also benefited from a shock absorber, as gains from 
high copper prices had gone into a stabilization fund known as the FEC that by 1997 was 
valued at $1.85 billion.  This money, combined with Chile’s other exchange reserves, 
defended investor confidence in the Peso despite the plummeting price of copper.  Chile’s 
liabilities were also comprised predominantly of long term notes, as Chile placed a tax on 
 
185 (“Chile: All Good Things Must Slow Down.” 1998) 
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inflows discouraging so called “hot money.”  Capital inflows were generally maintained 
throughout the crisis.  Chile’s government not only survived the crisis, but its reputation 
as a model of economic reform also outlived the crisis.  If anything, the East Asian Crisis 
solidified the reputation of Chile as one of the safest investments in the region.   
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The elected governments of Frei and Lagos continued to serve out their terms, and 
Chile’s GDP per capita has continued to grow, reaching an estimated $11,300 in 
purchasing power parity by 2005.186 
Conclusion 
 
186 The Economist. “Country Backgrounders: Chile.” Available from 
http://www.economist.com/research/backgrounders/displayBackgrounder.cfm?bg=884616; Internet; 
accessed 1 Nov. 2005. 
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Chile serves as a relative success story for free-market reform.  Part of Chile’s 
success was due to non-replicable informal institutions and economic and political 
conditions.  However, Chile’s success was also due to more classical economic 
prescriptions such as the maintenance of positive fiscal and current account balances, the 
minimization of debt, and the accumulation of hefty foreign currency reserves.  In 
addition, Chile owes much of its policy success to more unorthodox policies, such as the 
Capital Inflow Tax and the Copper Stabilization Fund.  This unconventional mix of 
economic wisdoms, employed in a favorable set of political and economic conditions, 
enabled Neoliberal reforms to have a dramatically positive effect on the wellbeing of the 
Chilean people and to outlive potential instability. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Comparative Analysis 
 
Argentina and Chile 
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Introduction  
 
The economic and political conditions in Argentina and Chile were relatively 
similar in the early 1990’s.  Both countries were transitioning to democracy and were 
implementing Neoliberal economic reforms.  In the early nineties, Argentina and Chile 
were seen as the darlings of free-market reforms, as both nations experienced relatively 
high levels of economic growth.  Liberalizing reforms put each country into closer trade 
relations with the rest of the world, especially with South East Asia.  However, the East 
Asian Crisis of 1997-98 affected the two countries differently.  This exogenous shock 
resulted in a recessionary period that climaxed with the collapse of the de la Rua 
government in Argentina, whereas Chile merely experienced a short economic downturn.  
It is the purpose of this section to determine why such different outcomes occurred in 
seemingly similar countries and to draw practical policy implications from the 
comparison.  This analysis will use the structure established by the causal model given in 
Chapter Three, which mirrors the cyclical nature of political and economic instability.    
 
Underlying Social and Economic Conditions 
 
One important distinction between Argentina and Chile relevant to this phase of 
the analysis is that of informal institutions.  While variables in this phase of the model are 
impossible to quantify, they nonetheless have a very meaningful impact on the 
development of political instability.  Political culture is an especially relevant example of 
these unquantifiable variables for the purposes of this comparison.  The political culture 
110
of a country determines the demands that citizens will place on the state and the 
propensity of citizens to rebel when frustrations occur.  Relative to Chile, Argentinean 
political culture seems to facilitate instability by both of these measures.  Argentine 
history since independence has witnessed significantly more examples of rebellion 
against the state than does that of Chile.  Since the 1930’s, Argentina has experienced 
five major unconstitutional regime changes, whereas Chile has had only one.187 While 
insurrections cannot be entirely blamed on cultural differences, the history seems to bring 
credence to the idea that Argentineans have had a greater propensity to rebel than have 
Chileans in recent history.  Indeed, Argentina did not develop a sense of national identity 
until well after independence was achieved.  Unlike Chile, the Argentine state was not 
fully consolidated until the mid 19th century, and a transient Gaucho identity survived 
long after that.  As Nicolas Shumway illustrates, “In no sense was the area [Argentina] 
unified by geography, politics, economics, or a particular vision of national destiny.  
What cities existed were in reality isolated towns and missions connected by poor or 
nonexistent roads and dreadfully slow land travel.”188 
In more recent times, there is evidence to suggest that Argentine citizens place 
greater demands on the government to directly provide public goods, especially under 
poor economic conditions.  When asked in the 1995 Latinobarometro poll whether the 
government should give priority to diminishing inflation or increasing the rate of 
employment, 70% of Argentines chose to increase employment, whereas only 55% of 
Chileans said the same.189 This discrepancy is easily explained by the difference in the 
national rates of unemployment aforementioned, yet the political ramification of this 
 
187 (“Timeline: Argentina.” 2005) and (“Timeline: Chile.” 2005) 
188 Nicolas Shumway, The Invention of Argentina (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 9. 
189 (“Informe de Prensa. Latinobarometro.” 1995, 7) 
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discrepancy is significant.  By the mid-nineties, Argentine citizens were not only fed up 
with the performance of the economy, but they were turning to the government to provide 
the employment that the market had failed to provide.  The political culture of Argentina 
during the crisis period facilitated instability, and necessitated a greater state capacity to 
minimize citizens’ frustrations with economic conditions. 
 In some respects, the economic conditions in Argentina and Chile were very 
similar leading up to the crises of the late 1990s.  Since democratization, the two 
economies experienced impressive rates of growth.  At 1991 prices, the GDP index for 
1994 was 122.6 in Argentina and 127.0 in Chile.  Both countries successfully 
implemented tight fiscal and monetary policies that brought down inflation to moderate 
levels by 1994: 3.9% in Argentina and 8.9% in Chile.190 Yet by other measures, the two 
economies were responding to reform quite differently.  Perhaps the most striking 
contrast between the two countries for the pre-crisis period was evident in the level of 
unemployment.  In 1995, Argentina’s national rate of unemployment was 34.7%, while in 
Chile, unemployment had declined to 7.3%.  The trade balance was another conditional 
difference between the two countries for this period.  In 1995, the value of Chilean 
exports outweighed imports by 9.4%, whereas Argentina experienced a negative trade 
balance in which imports outweighed exports by 12%.191 A glimpse at the historical 
decline of inflation in Chile during this period suggests that Chilean monetary and fiscal 
authorities pursued deflationary policies less aggressively than their counterparts in 
Argentina, allowing the rate of inflation to decline more gradually. 
 
190 Roberto Frenkel, “Real Exchange Rate and Employment in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico,” El 
Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad: La Universidad de Buenos Aires (2004): 36, 37. 
191 (Frenkel 2004, 36-37) 
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The level of economic well-being experienced by citizens was very different 
between the two nations in the mid 1990s.  The perception of average citizens as to the 
success or failure of Neoliberal economics and political democracy is extremely 
important for this analysis, as this perception largely determines the level of political 
support for continued reform.  A survey done in 1995 by the Chilean non-governmental 
organization, Latinobarometro, suggests that Chileans perceived more significant 
improvements to their standards of living in the previous five years than did 
Argentineans.  When asked if the quality of their education had increased significantly in 
the last five years, 38% of Chileans responded positively, whereas only 12% of 
Argentineans shared that sentiment.  47% of Chileans said that the quality of their 
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housing had improved, whereas only 24% of Argentineans said the same.192 The 
responses to the same question in regards to the quality of health were less distinct, but 
again, more Chileans responded positively.  Chileans also expressed a substantially more 
positive outlook in regards to their ability to improve their own lives.  When asked if they 
believed that they had greater opportunities to improve their standard of living than did 
their parents, 58% of Chileans answered yes while only 39% of Argentines said the 
same.193 
These figures suggest that by the mid 1990s, Chilean citizens had begun to 
experience the benefits of market liberalizing reforms to a much greater degree than had 
Argentineans.  This point is extremely important for the comparative analysis in two 
ways: one, on the level of policy making and two, in regards to the likelihood of average 
citizens to rebel.  The benefits of liberalization had been experienced in Chile, resulting 
in a greater political support for the direction that policy makers had taken.  Therefore, 
where these benefits were experienced, policy makers would be more likely to continue 
to broaden and deepen liberalizing economic reforms.  Argentinean policy makers were 
therefore, relatively more compelled to roll back on reforms.  The second important 
implication is that economic expectations of long-run growth under the current system 
had been elevated in Chile such that short-run negative outcomes would be less likely to 
result in frustration or participation in acts of dissidence.  Therefore, an economic 
downturn in Chile was less likely to produce political instability than if the same were to 
occur in Argentina.  Chile happened to have begun Neoliberal reforms earlier than 
Argentina under an authoritarian regime, and the benefits had begun to materialize by the 
 
192 Latinobarometro. “Informe de Prensa: Latinobarometro.” Santiago: Latinobarometro. 1995. Available 
from http://www.latinobarometro.org/index.php?id=66; Internet; accessed 26 Feb. 2005. 16. 
193 (“Informe de Prensa: Latinobarometro.” 1995, 17) 
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time the policy making process was democratized.  While this particular example of 
reform timing seems to have worked effectively, it is not the only way to reform, nor is it 
the most socially or politically desirable.  That inflation was reduced more gradually in 
Chile was however, a conscious policy decision with demonstrably positive effects. 
 The policy implications of this phase of the analysis are twofold: reforms must be 
given time to work before they are abandoned.  Reforms can be given time to work in one 
of three ways: by controlling the reaction of citizens to potential short-run negative 
outcomes, by temporarily supporting citizens through the short-run costs, or by pacing 
reforms more gradually.  The second possible method is clearly more socially and 
politically desirable than the first, but it assumes that the government has the resources to 
minimize potentially massive individual economic costs through price subsidies or other 
safety nets.  Furthermore, such government intervention designed to minimize the 
individual costs of reform could undermine the very economic objectives attempted by 
the reforms, such as fiscal balance and the reduction of inflation.  The ultimate 
implication of this phase of the analysis is that the timing of reforms is extremely 
important.  Reforms must be paced appropriately in order for reforms to be politically 
and economically sustainable.  Rapid reform, or so called “Shock Therapy,” may be so 
politically and economically destabilizing that it risks undermining the entire reform 
process.  
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The Relative Capacity of the State 
 
Given the demands citizens place upon the state to provide public goods, and the 
propensity of citizens to rebel if these demands are not met, it is the capacity of the state 
to resolve citizens’ frustrations that ultimately determines the political outcome of 
instability.  The capacity of the state to address frustrations is a product of the states 
ability to coercively control dissidence or to support frustrated citizens through 
institutions.  The ability of the state to remedy frustrations before they become 
destabilizing is determined by the institutional structure and the amount of resources 
available to the state.  The Chilean government had a greater capacity to resolve 
frustrations by each of these measures.  The Chilean democratic governments of the 
Concertación coalition were relatively effective at deciding on and executing policies in a 
timely manner.  Presidents Aylwin and Frei enjoyed widespread support in parliament 
from the center and left, and the mutual threat of renewed military control strengthened 
bonds between political parties and facilitated cooperation.  Argentina’s relatively less 
centralized executive branch experienced calls from parliament for exemptions from 
policies designed to stabilize state spending and monetary policy.  The Argentine federal 
government could not regulate the excessive spending of the provinces; nor could it end 
the practice of bailing the provinces out of payment obligations.194 
Chile’s post-authoritarian governments returned to democratic principles more 
easily, developing an institutional structure that facilitated the efficient government 
response to instability.  Chile’s government was also more capable of dealing with an 
economic downturn in that it had greater access to resources.  The administrative reforms 
 
194 (Desai 2003, 182) 
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launched by President Aylwin in 1990 successfully improved the efficiency of the tax 
collection system.  Within the year, these reforms increased government revenue by as 
much as 2% of GNP.  This money was then used to bolster social programs, the bulk of 
which were aimed at improving human capital, but money was also spent on safety net 
insurance policies.195 Government revenue also increased from the state copper company 
and royalties from foreign production in other key export commodities.  As copper prices 
were high and oil prices were relatively low, the Chilean government was able to use 
export earnings to increase the funding destined for the Copper Stabilization Fund (FEC).  
This Fund will be discussed in greater detail in later sections.  The external balance of 
trade and the internal efficiency of administration provided the Chilean state with the 
resources necessary to soften the effect of an exogenous shock on the livelihood of 
Chilean citizens.   
 On the other hand, the Argentine government lacked the administrative efficacy 
and resources necessary to react to the crisis.  Tax evasion in Argentina reduced 
government revenue by an estimated $35 billion a year during the 1990’s.196 The 
superior financial position of the Chilean state is further evidenced by its fiscal account 
balances relative to that of Argentina throughout the period of crisis.  The Argentine 
fiscal balance had deteriorated steadily since 1993, and in 1997 alone the federal budget 
deficit was close to 2% of GDP.197 In Chile, central government expenditures were 
relatively in line with average revenues for the 1990s, and the government achieved a 
 
195 (Scully 1996, 101) 
196 (Desai 2003, 183) 
197 (Desai 2003, 178) 
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sizable surplus in 1995 of more than 177 billion Chilean Pesos.198 Chile’s government 
was better positioned to deal with the potential political ramifications of economic shocks 
due to an impressive institutional structure and the availability of state resources.  
Argentina’s institutional structure and lack of state resources created conditions in which 
an external financial shock could limit the states capacity to function so drastically so as 
to render the executive incapable of governing.  Competition among the parties further 
undermined the ability of the Argentine executive to make quick decisions in the months 
preceding the collapse of the Peso.  Carlos Menem was unable to broaden and deepen 
stabilization reforms to the same degree of Chilean democratic presidents as competition 
between the Peronistas and the Radicals limited the ability of the government to react 
quickly to changing economic conditions.   
 The policy implication of this point of the analysis is that reforms must be 
properly sequenced in order to minimize potentially destabilizing costs or reform 
rollback.  The most obvious element of this implication is that there are certain 
prerequisites for Neoliberal reform to function properly.  These necessary preconditions 
are not entirely financial.  This important point directly pertains to the expressed policies 
of the IMF and other international financial institutions which are known to view the 
political ramifications of their actions as “not their problem.”199 
As the Chile case demonstrates, Neoliberal reforms function best under 
governments that are capable of compiling the proper mix of support, control, and 
adjustment.  Before reforms are attempted, the correct institutional structure must be 
established and the adequate state resources must be gathered in preparation for 
 
198 El Banco Central de Chile. Base de Datos Económicos. Available from 
http://si2.bcentral.cl/Basededatoseconomicos/951_portada.asp?idioma=E; Internet; accessed Feb. 26 2005. 
199 From the documentary film, “Life and Debt” produced and directed by Stephanie Black (2001). 
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exogenous shocks and other potential setbacks.  The second, less obvious element of this 
implication is that reforms must be sequenced in the proper order for instability to be 
minimized.  For example, in Chile, the reformation of the tax system implemented by 
Pinochet and Aylwin was so important because it provided the necessary funding to 
underwrite a degree of stability throughout later reforms.  A certain amount of control on 
the part of the federal government also seems to be a necessary prerequisite, without 
which the efficacy of reforms can be undermined by provincial governments or opposing 
political parties.  Furthermore, the proper sequencing of reforms may vary from country 
to country depending on the underlying social, economic, and political conditions.  The 
ultimate implication of this phase of the analysis is that liberalizing reforms must be 
properly sequenced, and that some of the prerequisites are political. 
 
The Reaction of Markets 
 
At this point in the analysis it should be reiterated that the causal model of 
instability put forth in this study need not necessarily start with any given phase.  If the 
cycle of instability always began with economic conditions than many discrepancies 
between countries that occurred in later phases could be due in large part to success or 
failure in previous phases.    For instance in this comparison, it is true that part of Chile’s 
relative success in maintaining market stability is due to the fact that Chile did not 
experience the same amount of political or economic instability as did Argentina.  
However, part of Chile’s market stability is also due to key financial mechanisms that 
function irrespective of the presence or absence of economic and political instability.  As 
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instability can begin or end in any of the given phases, successful policies are just as 
necessary in each phase. 
 Under similar economic conditions, Chile and Argentina employed very different 
financial mechanisms that led to their respective success or failure.  Argentina’s financial 
policies rested on a currency pegged to the U.S. dollar.  Elemental to the failure of 
Argentina’s currency peg was the rising debt that the Argentine government, banking 
industry, and business community were burdened with in dollar denominated notes.  By 
1999, Argentina’s foreign debt had surged above 50% of the value of GDP.200 By this 
point, a devaluation of the Peso would have greatly increased the real value of that debt 
and made repayment impossible, triggering further currency devaluations.  The failure of 
the Argentine financial system lay in that investor confidence was tied to the rigidity of 
the Peso, when the currency’s value had become out of sink with economic conditions.  
As Brazil’s flexible Real began to decline, investor worries about the unsustainable 
overvaluation of the Argentine currency expressed via the increased frequency and vigor 
of speculative attacks, which began to drain Argentina’s currency reserves.   
 
200 (Desai 2003, 179) 
120
Southern Cone Currencies Against the Dollar
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The inflexibility of the currency ultimately led to the massive erosion of investor 
confidence which brought unavoidable capital flight and devaluation, forcing rapid 
government spending cuts and a default on public debt.  By 2001, capital flight in 
Argentina produced an enormous increase in consumer prices.  This temporary bout of 
hyperinflation not only evidences the failure of Argentine financial stabilization policies, 
but it also represents how this failure impacted the well-being of individual Argentines.   
Consumer Prices
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Chile employed a unique mix of heterodox and Neoliberal reforms.  As markets 
were opened up to foreign capital, the government maintained tight restrictions on fiscal 
spending and the central bank imposed gradual deflationary monetary policy.  Banking 
regulation and the privatization of the pension system were both executed with a great 
deal of success, thereby contributing to savings and investment while minimizing 
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government liabilities and thereby providing stability to the overall system.  Chile did not 
peg the Peso to the US dollar or another strong currency, but rather allowed the currency 
to float within a predetermined but flexible range before intervening with foreign 
currency reserves.  The Central Bank’s foreign currency reserves and the revenue from 
the Copper Stabilization Fund were instrumental in defending the value of the currency.  
Chile’s pro-market policies were so successful that not only was capital flight avoided, 
but foreign investment actually increased during the period.  Foreign direct investment 
increased especially, hitting a three year peak of $11 billion US in 1999.201 The steady 
increase of foreign investment throughout the recession is undeniable evidence for the 
relative success of Chile’s mechanisms of financial stability. 
 In addition to these important financial stabilizers, Chile pioneered two particular 
financial mechanisms that were instrumental in its successful maintenance of stability 
through the recession of 1998-99: the Copper Stabilization Fund and the capital inflow 
tax.  The Copper Stabilization Fund was established in 1985 in an attempt to stabilize 
fiscal revenues by requiring savings of commodity receipts during boom times.  The 
concept was simple; save during the good times to make it through the bad times.  The 
fund played a large part in ensuring government savings, especially during the late 1980’s 
when copper prices were high, and by 1997 the value of the fund peaked at $3.9 billion 
US.202 The savings rules of the Fund were automatic, requiring a given rate of savings 
unless the law is changed.  The Fund helped deflect political demands for government 
spending, especially during the transition to democracy.  While the surplus savings 
generated by the Copper Stabilization Fund were not enough to single handedly diffract 
 
201 (Base de Datos Económicos 2005) 
202 Guillermo Perry. “Can Fiscal Rules Help Reduce Macroeconomic Volatility in LAC?” (Washington 
DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2002), 16. 
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the fiscal costs of the economic downturn of 1998 and 99, the reserves absorbed a great 
deal of the potential shortfall.203 In addition to the CSF, the Central Bank of Chile had 
consistently increased the foreign currency reserve as another potential shock absorber.  
Perhaps even more importantly, Chile’s reserves boosted investor confidence throughout 
the period and contributed to the increase of capital inflows and the reduction of interest 
payments on national debt, even in spite of the recession and currency collapse in 
neighboring Argentina. 
 The capital inflow tax is another, more heterodox method employed by the 
Chilean government that contributed to the maintenance of financial stability.  The tax 
evolved to minimize the potentially destabilizing impact of short-term capital flows.  
International investors often attempt to maximize rates of return in emerging market 
economies with high risk premiums, while simultaneously minimizing risk exposure by 
playing extremely short-term positions.  The result is asset price volatility that hinders 
economic growth and can be, as was the case in South East Asia, dangerously 
destabilizing.  Economies whose debt is held largely in short-term notes are particularly 
susceptible to financial instability, as changing investor sentiments can produce rapid 
capital outflows and rising interest rates that can make debt servicing impossible, such as 
was the case in Argentina.  Since 1992, Chile has actively discouraged short-term capital 
inflows by effectively taxing capital based on the duration of its stay in the country.  It 
does so by requiring that 30% of all non-equity capital entering the country must be 
deposited within the central bank for one year.  In essence, this becomes a tax on inflows 
that proportionally offsets gains with the remaining 70%, especially for investments with 
short durations.  In addition, the Chilean government limits the ability of local banks to 
 
203 (Perry 2002, 17) 
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receive financing from international capital markets to those banks that receive a credit 
rating greater than or equal to that of Chilean sovereign debt securities.  Finally, all 
foreign capital inflows greater than $10,000 must stay in the country for at least one 
year.204 The first and third regulations restrict short-term capital flows and the second 
regulation ensures that all capital flows entering Chile go through financially sound, 
responsible entities.  The overall impact of the capital inflow tax, according to a variety 
of assessments, has been to shift the duration of foreign investments towards longer-term 
maturities without reducing the overall inflow of foreign capital into Chile.205 The capital 
inflow tax also impacts the perception of investors, making Chile a less risky investment 
for longer term investors.  The general increase of portfolio investment in Chile, despite 
the absence of hedge funds, evidences the success of the capital inflow tax.  Despite the 
regulations, portfolio investment in Chile topped $10 billion US in 2000 and has 
continued to rise.206 
204 The Economist. “Of Take-Offs and Tempests: Can Capital Controls Stop Poor Countries Crashing?”
Available from http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=371608; Internet; accessed 1 Nov. 
2005. 
205 (Desai 2003, 254) 
206 (Base de Datos Económicos 2005) 
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There are several clear policy implications from this phase of the analysis in 
regards to financial management.  First, stability must be facilitated by balancing fiscal 
accounts and through anti-inflationary monetary policy.  It is important to maintain the 
flexibility of the currency, but central bank intervention may be useful if the currency 
surpasses a set range.  Also, the transparency and certainty with which policy makers 
address and deal with international investors can help to solidify investor confidence.  In 
addition to these more obvious implications of the comparison, the government should 
maintain foreign currency reserves, garnered through commodity export receipts during 
boom times when possible, in order to defend the currency and the fiscal balance during 
potential crises.  Finally, potentially destabilizing short-term capital flows should be 
discouraged when a country can afford to do so.  In these ways, the market impact of 
political or economic instability can be avoided.   
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Market Instability and Domestic Economic Conditions 
 
The cycle of instability is potentially completed by this final phase, when the 
price setting function of the markets impacts domestic economic conditions.  In general, 
the more open an economy is to international financial markets, the more of an impact 
confidence crises can have on the domestic economy.  In instances where financial 
instability stems from the irresponsible financial actions of the state, the greater the role 
of the state in the economy the more the economy will be affected by financial instability.  
When the markets have been opened up to international trade and capital, and where the 
state still plays a major role in the economy, the economic impact of unsustainable or 
irresponsible fiscal or monetary policy can be catastrophic.  The state may be forced to 
look inward to rapidly raise money and cut costs, as any sign of default or devaluation of 
assets held by foreign investors would bring massive capital flight.  Government cost 
cutting can have a significantly detrimental impact on the economic conditions 
experienced by average citizens.  That the financial crisis had a very real impact on the 
lifestyles of average Argentineans is given credence by the number of mobile phone 
subscriptions made during the period.  Mobile phone subscriptions have increased over 
time, almost universally for the past 15 years.  A significant drop is significant because it 
implies that people were forced to cancel or drop their phone plans, and this is not a 
sacrifice easily made.  Mobile phone subscriptions decreased in Argentina in 2001, while 
in Chile, the number of subscriptions continued its steady increase.  Such frustration can 
be extremely politically destabilizing, thereby completing the cycle of instability. 
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Throughout the incredibly instable period of 2000 to 2002, both Argentina and 
Chile experienced economic recessions.  The economic downturn in Argentina, however, 
was significantly deeper and longer lasting. 
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During this period, the Argentine government was forced to cut spending and 
raise taxes in a series of last ditch efforts to avoid default or devaluation.  It was these 
spending cuts and banking restrictions that ultimately produced enough political 
instability to topple the government.  The excessive spending and debt accumulated by 
the provincial governments forced these destabilizing cuts.  The failure of the Argentine 
state run pension fund to make payments was also instrumental in the extension of market 
instability to the pockets of average Argentine citizens.  Foreign debt as a percentage of 
GDP exceeded 100% as Argentina’s financial position rapidly worsened.  In Chile, fiscal 
accounts were not burdened with provincial debt, nor was the privatized pension system 
costly to the federal government. 
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The policy implication of this phase of the analysis is that countries opening up 
their financial markets need to be extremely cognizant of increasing debt, and the 
potential that external capital shocks can impact the capacity of citizens to meet their own 
economic expectations.  State workers generally expect to get paid and receive pension 
fund payments.  Therefore, the actual capacity of citizens to obtain things of value will 
clearly fall short of their expectations if the government is forced to suspend payments.  
In turn, the frustration felt by citizens will be especially strong and directed at the 
government when the state is forced to rapidly cut spending.  The potential for market 
instability to impact underlying economic conditions is heightened by the degree to 
which the government plays a role in the economy, employing workers and managing 
pension funds.  In countries where capital markets have been liberalized but in which the 
government still experiences routine budget shortfalls, the potential for economic and 
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political crisis can be enormous.  Fiscal account reforms and privatizations should come 
before market liberalization.  In addition, government liabilities should be made as 
flexible as possible, and policy makers should inform citizens as soon as possible about 
unplanned spending changes in order to minimize expectations shortfalls.  The ultimate 
policy implication of this phase is not only that fiscal accounts must be balanced 
throughout reforms, but also that the flexibility and transparency of policies is of the 
utmost importance. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This analysis has shown that while the success of Chile is in part the non-
replicable product of social and cultural phenomena or factor endowments, Chile’s 
success was due, in part, to conscious policy decisions.  Some of the discrepancy in 
political and economic outcomes between Chile and Argentina was a product of differing 
informal institutions, such as political culture, and therefore this aspect of the comparison 
does not yield practical policy applications.  The underlying economic conditions 
throughout the reform period clearly facilitated the reform process.  This suggests that 
countries should attempt major adjustments during periods of growth rather than during 
the crises that usually spur their hurried inception.  It is worth reiterating that the 
successful policies employed in Chile were derived from a mixture of seemingly 
incompatible schools of thought. 
 While not all of the causes of Chile’s success are replicable, some of the lessons 
learned by the relative success of Chile provide useful policy recommendations.  The 
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practical policy recommendations of this analysis include: the incorporation of an 
analysis of the political ramifications into the reform process, the centralization of 
authority to the degree that economic policy makers will be capable of defending national 
interests such as the currency and the fiscal account, the pacing and sequencing of 
reforms, the preservation of fiscal account balances throughout the course of reform, the 
maintenance of large foreign currency reserves as an insurance policy against financial 
instability, the minimization of short-term capital flows, and the flexibility and 
transparency of policy making. 
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Chapter Eight 
 
Conclusion 
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In the age of globalization, the rules of the world system have changed.  National 
economies must adjust or face long-run stagnation.  So far, there have been clear winners 
and losers.  The aim of this study was to explore the historical examples of success and 
failure in order to see what it takes to benefit from globalization.  It was the purpose of 
this study to identify a winning policy strategy for the developing world.   
The successes achieved by Chile and several South East Asian states were due to 
an unconventional mix of economic wisdoms.  While belonging to different economic 
and political doctrines, the policies employed by the Chilean fiscal and monetary 
authorities were complementary in the pursuit of stable economic growth.  These policies 
represented a successful compromise in the typical academic struggle between the Post-
Keynesians and the Neoliberals.   Unfortunately, the positive outcomes achieved in Chile, 
Taiwan, and Singapore may not easily be replicated under different economic and 
political conditions.  Successful adjustment to the global economy is in part the non-
replicable product of social and cultural phenomena, and economic and political 
conditions. 
 A particular set of social, political, and economic conditions can be especially 
beneficial, even necessary for the reform process.  In terms of social conditions, informal 
institutions that reinforce cooperation, moderation, and stability seem to facilitate reform.  
States in which there is a political culture of dissidence are more likely to roll back on 
reforms as citizens express their frustrations through collective political action.  Cultures 
with an above average propensity to save are also better protected from potential crisis, as 
domestic savings are generally less mobile and less subject to erosions of confidence 
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during crises.  Extremely high rates of domestic savings played an important role in the 
maintenance of stability in Taiwan and Singapore throughout the East Asian Crisis.   
 Politically, a democracy dominated by a strong coalition of parties seems to be the 
best system in which to attempt reforms.  Dictatorships clearly enjoy the ability to control 
or ignore citizens during the costly transition to liberalization, but a closed decision 
making process will inevitably produce one sided reforms benefiting the economic 
interests of the elite.  Where this has occurred it has reinforced the notion that 
Neoliberalism only benefits the rich.  Democracies are much more capable of delivering 
the kinds of deregulation that can allow lower classes to enjoy the benefits of capital 
inflows and access to foreign markets.  However, the presence of a strong opposition 
party to capitalize on the frustrations caused by adjustment can terminate reforms before 
they are given the chance to work.  Strong democratic coalitions seem to provide the 
proper mix of stability and equity.   
 The economic conditions that facilitate the reform process are much more easily 
identifiable.  Reforming economies benefit from high export prices and low import 
prices, especially for relatively inelastic goods such as petroleum and food.  Export 
revenues are important during liberalization because they generate political support for 
reforms and because they provide the currency reserves necessary to defend against 
speculative attacks.  Recessions or financial crises often provide the impetus to 
Neoliberal reforms, yet the reform process would be much more effective if conducted 
during periods of economic growth. 
 While social, political, and economic conditions are very important to the reform 
process, favorable conditions are not a free ticket to prosperity.  Where there has been 
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success, it has been the result of conscious policy decisions.  As such, there are several 
policy lessons to be learned from this study.  First and foremost, successful reform 
requires thoughtful and interdisciplinary analysis.  Success or failure will not be 
determined entirely by the financials, but by underlying social, political, and economic 
conditions as well.  Second, the pacing and sequencing of reforms must be designed to 
minimize the short-run costs and to hasten the arrival of the long-run benefits.  The 
timing of reforms must also take domestic politics into consideration, as the failure to do 
so will result in the rollback of reforms.  Third, there are orthodox and heterodox 
financial mechanisms that can be employed to stabilize the reform process.  Reforms 
should not be attempted without the necessary currency reserves that can be used to 
defend against speculative attacks.  Debt minimization is another very important financial 
requisite.  Short-term capital flows should be discouraged, especially during the reform 
process in which the domestic economy is especially exposed to exogenous shocks.  
Fourth, reform policies must be consistent and transparent in order to maintain the 
confidence of investors whose potential for exit poses the greatest danger to reforming 
economies. 
 Further study of the political economy of globalization is needed.  A regional 
comparison between Latin America and East Asia could provide a useful counterpoint to 
the examples of success and failure at the state level that have been analyzed in this 
study.  A regional analysis could shed light on the efficacy of a state assisted transition to 
the market and the effect of informal institutions on the reform process.  It would be 
interesting to study the long-run effects of reform role back in the developing world.  
Over the next few years, Latin America will become the focal point of the debate over 
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Neoliberalism and globalization as leftist nationalism rises in protest to the Washington 
Consensus.  Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales, and Ollanta Humala embody the political 
backlash to globalization.  Whether these experiments in “21st century socialism” succeed 
or fail will likely determine the direction of global economic policy as it is applied to the 
developing world. 
 The paradox of Neoliberalism is that, if not managed properly, the negative short-
run and distributive effects of Neoliberal reforms will endanger the political viability of 
the reform process itself.  Neoliberal reforms typically generate negative short-run 
outcomes and can render the state vulnerable to exogenous shocks during the course of 
reform.  The occurrence of a financial crisis in a liberalizing economy begs the question: 
were negative outcomes a product of the Neoliberal reform itself or of the insufficiency 
of the reforms achieved?  Proponents of the latter view have used the occurrence of 
financial crises in reforming countries as evidence of a need for further reform, whereas 
proponents of the former view have used the same crises as evidence of the general 
failure of Neoliberal policies.  Neither of these views provides a solution to the paradox.  
Instead, where Neoliberalism has failed to generate positive outcomes it has been the 
result either of unfavorable social, political, or economic conditions, or of clear policy 
failures.  The standard reforms prescribed by the Washington Consensus must be 
modified to heed the policy lessons of the past. 
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